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University of South Florida

An Efficient Run-time CFI Check for Embedded Processors to Detect and Prevent Control Flow Based Attacks

Abstract

dc:description

A popular software attack on a program is by transferring the program control to malicious code inserted into the program. Control Flow Integrity (CFI) check has been proposed as a detection mechanism for control flow deviation. In the context of embedded processors, this thesis proposes a novel approach to implement CFI to detect and stall under a control flow attack. We exploit the unused bits in an instruction word to embed a label that can be used to check CFI during runtime. Given a control flow graph, we embed a unique label in each instruction in a basic block such that a given property is satisfied by labels along a valid control flow edge. For example, the hamming distance between any two basic blocks in a legal path is less than 5 and in illegal paths, it is greater than 5. In a five stage processor pipeline, when an instruction is fetched, its label is checked against prior instruction's label for the known property (i.e., hamming distance of 5). We implemented the proposed approach in the SimpleScalar toolset and validated on 7 embedded application benchmarks chosen from MiBench benchmark suite. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first time the control flow information is embedded in the executable binary that is used for CFI check during the runtime.

Degree

thesis:*
Name thesis:degree_name
MS in Computer Science (M.S.C.S.)
Level thesis:degree_level
Thesis
Discipline thesis:degree_discipline
Computer Science and Engineering
Grantor
University of South Florida
Year dc:date
2019

Author and committee

dc:creator, dc:contributor.*
Author dc:creator
  • Polnati, Srivarsha
Contributors dc:contributor
  • Srinivas Katkoori, Ph.D.
  • Jay Ligatti, Ph.D.
  • Hao Zheng, Ph.D.

Subjects

dc:subject × 5

Identifiers

dc:identifier.*
Repository record dc:identifier
https://digitalcommons.usf.edu/etd/8404

Chain of custody

source
Harvested from
University of South Florida
Base URL
digitalcommons.usf.edu/do/oai/
Last updated
2026-11-19
Source record
OAI-PMH GetRecord
citation

Polnati, Srivarsha. An Efficient Run-time CFI Check for Embedded Processors to Detect and Prevent Control Flow Based Attacks. Thesis thesis, University of South Florida, 2019. https://digitalcommons.usf.edu/etd/8404