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University of Victoria (Canada)
David Chalmers' "hard problem" of consciousness : a critique
Abstract
dc:description.abstractIn this thesis, I will argue against the idea, put forth most notably in recent times by David Chalmers and Frank Jackson, that a relationship based on logical necessitation or a priori entailment is required for there to be an adequate reductive explanation. I will argue, rather, that the paradigm cases of purported logical necessitation or a priori entailment do not obtain. Therefore, the case for logical necessitation or a priori entailment being an explication of reductive explanation is weak.
Degree
thesis:*- Level thesis:degree_level
- Master of Arts M.A.
- Department thesis:degree_department
- Department of Philosophy
- Year dc:date.issued
- 2003
Author and committee
dc:creator, dc:contributor.*- Author dc:creator
-
- Burgoyne, Anthony Joseph
Rights
dc:rights- Statement dc:rights
-
- Available to the World Wide Web
Identifiers
dc:identifier.*- Handle dc:identifier.uri
- https://hdl.handle.net/1828/17136