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University of Victoria (Canada)

Non-propositional knowledge in Plato and Wittgenstein

Abstract

dc:description.abstract

In the Blue Book, Wittgenstein explicitly opposes his own method of philosophical investigation to that of Socrates, who will not accept a list of examples even as a preliminary answer to his 'what-is-x' question. Relying on Meno and the Seventh Letter however, I will provide an interpretation of Plato's epistemic priority principle that does away with the assumption that what Socrates seeks is the uniquely correct definition of x. Following the work of Fransisco J. Gonzalez, I will argue that the philosopher seeks knowledge of x itself and that this knowledge is non-propositional. An interesting result is that Plato and Wittgenstein turn out to have extremely similar conceptions of philosophy. In particular, I argue that the distinction between doxa and episteme in Plato should be understood along the lines of Wittgenstein's distinction between saying and showing.

Degree

thesis:*
Level thesis:degree_level
Master of Arts M.A.
Department thesis:degree_department
Department of Philosophy
Year dc:date.issued
2010

Author and committee

dc:creator, dc:contributor.*
Author dc:creator
  • Fryer, Ian David
Advisor dc:contributor.supervisor
  • Zwicky, Jan

Subjects

dc:subject × 4

Rights

dc:rights
Statement dc:rights
  • Available to the World Wide Web
Language dc:language.iso
en, English

Identifiers

dc:identifier.*
Handle dc:identifier.uri
http://hdl.handle.net/1828/2853

Chain of custody

source
Harvested from
University of Victoria (Canada)
Base URL
dspace.library.uvic.ca/server/oai/request
Last updated
2026-11-19
Source record
OAI-PMH GetRecord
citation

Fryer, Ian David. Non-propositional knowledge in Plato and Wittgenstein. Master of Arts M.A. thesis, 2010. http://hdl.handle.net/1828/2853