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University of Victoria (Canada)

Internal Accommodation in Moral Irrealism

Abstract

dc:description.abstract

In metaethics, moral irrealists argue that moral facts are neither ontologically real nor mind-independent. In moral semantics, irrealists who are descriptivist error theorists argue that typical moral claims attempt to report descriptive moral facts but that such facts do not exist, so typical moral claims are descriptively false or erroneous. Moral irrealists who are non-descriptivists, such as Mark Timmons, argue for a different function of moral claims. Timmons argues that moral claims attempt to guide action. He further maintains that moral claims can be true or false, but not according to a descriptivist function (he affirms cognitivism but denies descriptivism). I lay out Timmons‘ semantics and grapple with a number of objections to his view. I conclude that Timmons ought to discard his contextual truth-apt semantics and his non-descriptivism; instead he should defend the prescriptive, or evaluative, function of moral claims within an overarching descriptivist error theory.

Degree

thesis:*
Level thesis:degree_level
Master of Arts M.A.
Department thesis:degree_department
Department of Philosophy
Year dc:date.issued
2013

Author and committee

dc:creator, dc:contributor.*
Author dc:creator
  • Zolotar, Mark
Advisor dc:contributor.supervisor
  • Woodcock, Scott Frederick

Subjects

dc:subject × 6

Rights

dc:rights
Statement dc:rights
  • Available to the World Wide Web
Language dc:language.iso
en, English

Identifiers

dc:identifier.*
Handle dc:identifier.uri
http://hdl.handle.net/1828/4829

Chain of custody

source
Harvested from
University of Victoria (Canada)
Base URL
dspace.library.uvic.ca/server/oai/request
Last updated
2026-11-19
Source record
OAI-PMH GetRecord
citation

Zolotar, Mark. Internal Accommodation in Moral Irrealism. Master of Arts M.A. thesis, 2013. http://hdl.handle.net/1828/4829