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University of Victoria (Canada)

Protection against malicious JavaScript using hybrid flow-sensitive information flow monitoring

Abstract

dc:description.abstract

Modern web applications use several third-party JavaScript libraries to achieve higher levels of engagement. The third-party libraries range from utility libraries such as jQuery to libraries that provide services such as Google Analytics and context- sensitive advertisement. These third-party libraries have access to most (if not all) the elements of the displayed webpage. This allows malicious third-party libraries to perform attacks that steal information from the end-user or perform an action without the end-user consent. These types of attacks are the stealthiest and the hardest to defend against, because they are agnostic to the browser type and platform of the end-user and at the same time they rely on web standards when performing the attacks. Such kind of attacks can perform actions using the victim’s browser without her permission. The nature of such actions can range from posting an embarrassing message on the victim’s behalf over her social network account, to performing online biding using the victim’s account. This poses the need to develop effective mechanisms for protecting against client-side web attacks that mainly target the end-user. In the proposed research, we address the above challenges from information flow monitoring perspective by developing a framework that restricts the flow of information on the client-side to legitimate channels. The proposed model tracks sensitive information flow in the JavaScript code and prevents information leakage from happening. The main component of the framework is a hybrid flow-sensitive security monitor that controls, at runtime, the dissemination of information flow and its inlining. The security monitor is hybrid as it combines both static analysis and runtime monitoring of the running JavaScript program. We provide the soundness proof of the model with respect to termination-insensitive non-interference security policy and develop a new security benchmark to establish experimentally its effectiveness in detecting and preventing illicit information flow. When applied to the context of client-side web-based attacks, the proposed model provides a more secure browsing environment for the end-user.

Degree

thesis:*
Level thesis:degree_level
Doctor of Philosophy Ph.D.
Department thesis:degree_department
Department of Electrical and Computer Engineering
Year dc:date.issued
2016

Author and committee

dc:creator, dc:contributor.*
Author dc:creator
  • Sayed, Bassam
Advisor dc:contributor.supervisor
  • Traore, Issa

Subjects

dc:subject × 6

Rights

dc:rights
Statement dc:rights
  • Available to the World Wide Web
Language dc:language.iso
en, English

Identifiers

dc:identifier.*
Handle dc:identifier.uri
http://hdl.handle.net/1828/7063

Chain of custody

source
Harvested from
University of Victoria (Canada)
Base URL
dspace.library.uvic.ca/server/oai/request
Last updated
2026-11-19
Source record
OAI-PMH GetRecord
citation

Sayed, Bassam. Protection against malicious JavaScript using hybrid flow-sensitive information flow monitoring. Doctor of Philosophy Ph.D. thesis, 2016. http://hdl.handle.net/1828/7063