Virginia Commonwealth University
Generalized Second Price Auctions with Hierarchical Bidding
Abstract
dc:description.abstractThe sale of text advertisements on search engines using an auction format called Generalized Second Price (GSP) has become increasingly common. GSP is unique in that it allows bidders to revise their bid if they are unhappy with the result of the auction, and because the auction sells multiple units of a related good simultaneously. We model this sale as a hierarchical game with complete information, allowing one potential bidder to bid in each stage. The hierarchical game has an entirely different set of equilibria from the simultaneous bid game studied in earlier research on this auction. Under hierarchical bidding, Vickrey-Clarke-Groves guarantees higher auctioneer revenue than any equilibrium in GSP.
Degree
thesis:*- Name thesis:degree_name
- Master of Science
- Level thesis:degree_level
- Thesis
- Discipline thesis:degree_discipline
- Mathematical Sciences
Author and committee
dc:creator, dc:contributor.*- Author dc:creator
-
- Bryan, Kevin
- Contributors dc:contributor
-
- Jill Hardin
Subjects
dc:subject × 3Rights
dc:rights- Statement dc:rights
-
- © The Author
Identifiers
dc:identifier.*- Identifier
- https://scholarscompass.vcu.edu/etd/1608