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Virginia Commonwealth University

Generalized Second Price Auctions with Hierarchical Bidding

Abstract

dc:description.abstract

The sale of text advertisements on search engines using an auction format called Generalized Second Price (GSP) has become increasingly common. GSP is unique in that it allows bidders to revise their bid if they are unhappy with the result of the auction, and because the auction sells multiple units of a related good simultaneously. We model this sale as a hierarchical game with complete information, allowing one potential bidder to bid in each stage. The hierarchical game has an entirely different set of equilibria from the simultaneous bid game studied in earlier research on this auction. Under hierarchical bidding, Vickrey-Clarke-Groves guarantees higher auctioneer revenue than any equilibrium in GSP.

Degree

thesis:*
Name thesis:degree_name
Master of Science
Level thesis:degree_level
Thesis
Discipline thesis:degree_discipline
Mathematical Sciences

Author and committee

dc:creator, dc:contributor.*
Author dc:creator
  • Bryan, Kevin
Contributors dc:contributor
  • Jill Hardin

Subjects

dc:subject × 3

Rights

dc:rights
Statement dc:rights
  • © The Author

Identifiers

dc:identifier.*

Chain of custody

source
Harvested from
Virginia Commonwealth University
Base URL
scholarscompass.vcu.edu/do/oai/
Last updated
2026-11-19
Source record
OAI-PMH GetRecord
citation

Bryan, Kevin. Generalized Second Price Auctions with Hierarchical Bidding. Thesis thesis, https://doi.org/10.25772/6SVZ-MB84