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Virginia Commonwealth University

Stealthy Control Logic Attacks and Defense in Industrial Control Systems

Abstract

dc:description.abstract

Industrial control systems (ICS) play a crucial role in monitoring and managing critical infrastructure, including nuclear plants, oil and gas pipelines, and power grid stations. Programmable logic controllers (PLCs) are a fundamental component of ICS, directly interfacing with physical processes and implementing control logic programs that govern operations. Due to their significance in controlling critical infrastructure, PLCs often become prime targets for attackers seeking to disrupt these systems. Exploitable vulnerabilities in PLCs render them susceptible to such attacks. While many attacks on PLCs leave a large footprint in network traffic and are detectable by intrusion detection systems (IDS), this dissertation focuses on more stealthy and difficult-to-detect attacks. This dissertation explores various ways that PLCs can be vulnerable, starting with an empirical study of the authentication systems of different PLCs from various manufacturers to identify weaknesses. It examines how attackers can compromise a PLC's control logic without sending harmful code through the network, instead utilizing existing code already stored in the PLC's memory. Additionally, the research investigates network-based attacks that can bypass existing IDS without detection by exploiting PLC design features. A key focus is on identifying and analyzing the design features of PLCs that can be exploited to leverage attacks. Understanding these features highlights the vulnerabilities inherent in PLC designs that attackers can exploit to achieve their malicious goals. Furthermore, the dissertation proposes a detection framework capable of identifying control logic attacks by capturing and analyzing runtime data. Existing IDS can detect traditional attacks that inject malicious control logic, but attacks that manipulate data structures within the PLC's memory rather than the control logic itself are harder to detect. This proposed framework addresses these challenges, providing a robust defense against both traditional and stealthy attack vectors. In conclusion, this work addresses areas not previously explored, focusing on stealthy attacks that leave minimal footprints in network traffic and proposing a detection scheme capable of identifying these sophisticated attacks. This research contributes significantly to enhancing the security of critical infrastructure managed by ICS.

Degree

thesis:*
Name thesis:degree_name
Doctor of Philosophy
Level thesis:degree_level
Dissertation
Discipline thesis:degree_discipline
Computer Science

Author and committee

dc:creator, dc:contributor.*
Author dc:creator
  • Ayub, Adeen
Contributors dc:contributor
  • Irfan Ahmed

Subjects

dc:subject × 7

Rights

dc:rights
Statement dc:rights
  • © The Author

Identifiers

dc:identifier.*

Chain of custody

source
Harvested from
Virginia Commonwealth University
Base URL
scholarscompass.vcu.edu/do/oai/
Last updated
2026-11-19
Source record
OAI-PMH GetRecord
citation

Ayub, Adeen. Stealthy Control Logic Attacks and Defense in Industrial Control Systems. Dissertation thesis, https://doi.org/10.25772/6HVJ-A902