Institutional Repository of Vilnius University
Išpirkos reikalaujančių kenkimo programų atakų svarba kintančioje tarptautinėje politikoje galių sklaidos kontekste /
Abstract
dc:descriptionThis thesis aims to address the growing threat of ransomware attacks to states and their critical infrastructure in the cyberspace, despite the traditional perception of the state as a powerful and authoritative entity. The increasing number of attacks that encrypt data and demand ransom payments pose a challenge to states and closely related organizations, thereby threatening international security. The specific focus of this thesis is on the analysis of the WannaCry/NHS and US Colonial Pipeline ransomware attacks. The thesis argues that ransomware attacks are a globally relevant form of power diffusion. The objectives of the study are to: 1) critically evaluate Joseph Nye's theory of power projection; 2) develop a research model for the analysis of ransomware attacks; and 3) conduct an empirical analysis of selected cases. The research methodology employed in this study is case study. This approach provides a comprehensive analysis of ransomware attacks and, using Nye's theory and ENISA (European Agency for Cybersecurity) ransomware attack report, explains the results of the analysis and the impact of these attacks on states. The goal of this study was to support the claim that ransomware attacks are a global power diffusion tool. Two previously mentioned cases of ransomware attacks were chosen, which targeted critical infrastructure or state actors. The research is based on Joseph Nye's theory of power diffusion in international politics and its impact on the cyber domain as well as on empirical study of ransomware attacks from ENISA report. Empirical evidence was analyzed to demonstrate the threat of ransomware attacks to states and their critical infrastructure as well as to demonstrate occurrence of the power diffusion. In both cases, Colonial Pipeline and WannaCry attack on NHS, power diffusion was observed: ● In the case of Colonial Pipeline, power projection occurred between a non-state actor, the DarkSide cybercrime group, and a state actor, the Colonial Pipeline company, which belongs to the critical US infrastructure. ● In the case of the WannaCry attack, power projection occurred between a non-state actor, the Lazarus Group, and a state actor, the National Health Service (NHS), also belonging to critical infrastructure. The Colonial Pipeline attack highlighted the weaknesses of the country's critical infrastructure to cyber attacks and raised concerns about better cyber security measures for the energy sector. The incident also prompted the US government to take action to improve the country's cyber defense, including increased funding for cyber security programs and initiatives. The same is true for the aftermath of the NHS attack, where the UK government and cyber experts urged organizations to take security measures to protect their IT systems from future attacks, including system upgrades and backup storage of important data. This attack also highlighted the vulnerability of state critical infrastructure to cyber attacks and ransomware and the need for greater investment in cyber security, especially in NHS IT infrastructure. Regarding the NHS case, it should be noted that upon analyzing and systematizing information, it was discovered that the group identified by the government as responsible for the attack, the Lazarus Group, is potentially linked to the North Korean government and may be supported by it. Although mentioned, this finding does not affect the main conclusions of the study.
Degree
thesis:*- Grantor dc:publisher
- Institutional Repository of Vilnius University
- Year dc:date
- 2023
Author and committee
dc:creator, dc:contributor.*- Author dc:creator
-
- Bernotaitė, Dominyka,
Rights
dc:rights- Statement dc:rights
-
- info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
- Language dc:language
- lit
Identifiers
dc:identifier.*- Repository record dc:identifier
- https://repository.vu.lt/VU:ELABAETD192838416&prefLang=en_US