Institutional Repository of Vilnius University
Ar galime pažinti daiktą savaime? Meillassoux kontingencija ir Ferrario dokumentinė realybė /
Abstract
dc:descriptionThe main object of this study is the problem of thing-in-itself presented by Kant in Critique of Pure Reason. Kant states that we can not know the thing as it is in itself, but we can only think it. It seems that when we first encounter such notion the scope of problems are clear. While thing in itself is an important figure in the possibility of experience, nevertheless this intangile concept suppose that there must be something beyond the mind. The possibility of knowing thing-in-itself depends on how we postulate reality. If reality is what it simply is, then we can start to believe in knowing thing-in-itself. Quentin Meillassoux's contingency refers to a reality independent of our relationship with it, which is capable of absolute change at any time. It follows that the thing in itself can also become knowable. And the position that makes thing in itself even more recheable is what Maurizio Ferrari's introduces as social objects and documentary reality. Both of these positions will be examined.
Degree
thesis:*- Grantor dc:publisher
- Institutional Repository of Vilnius University
- Year dc:date
- 2025
Author and committee
dc:creator, dc:contributor.*- Author dc:creator
-
- Zelenkevičiūtė, Kamilė,
Rights
dc:rights- Statement dc:rights
-
- info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
- Language dc:language
- lit
Identifiers
dc:identifier.*- Repository record dc:identifier
- https://repository.vu.lt/VU:ELABAETD239030981&prefLang=en_US