Institutional Repository of Vilnius University
Device with tpm module attestation in organizations network using zero trust policy /
Abstract
dc:descriptionModern commercial networks are frequent targets for cybercriminals seeking unauthorized access to protected infrastructure. In the majority of conventional system configurations, network authentication relies primarily on reusable credentials such as passwords or shared secrets. If these credentials are exposed or stolen, the attackers can leverage them to gain unauthorized network access, bypassing traditional perimeter defenses. To address this challenge, our research investigates the possibility for integration of remote attestation mechanisms with Trusted Platform Modules (TPMs) to cryptographically prove to a remote verifier that the firmware is in an unaltered state and is trusted before a machine is allowed to enter the network. Remote attestation enables the system to cryptographically prove that the current state of software and hardware configuration matches a previously known, safe state. To achieve this, we will explore the use of Platform Configuration Registers (PCRs), a special register within the TPM module that holds the cryptographic fingerprints of system components. With special registers, we can bind the network authorization policy to a certain state of the device. If the machine fails remote attestation, due to malicious activity or undocumented changes, network access will be denied. This approach focuses on establishing and keeping a Zero Trust Architecture (ZTA).
Degree
thesis:*- Grantor dc:publisher
- Institutional Repository of Vilnius University
- Year dc:date
- 2026
Author and committee
dc:creator, dc:contributor.*- Author dc:creator
-
- Zykovič, Damian Olgierd,
Subjects
dc:subject × 1Rights
dc:rights- Statement dc:rights
-
- info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
- Language dc:language
- eng
Identifiers
dc:identifier.*- Repository record dc:identifier
- https://repository.vu.lt/VU:ELABAETD277691536&prefLang=en_US