Back to search

Institutional Repository of Vilnius University

Iranas be urano: kodėl Iranas atsisakė branduolinės programos /

Abstract

dc:description

After more than three decades of continuous sanctioning, in 2015 P5+1 (USA, UK, France, China, Russia and Germany) and Iran agreed on a Joint Comprehensive Plan of Actions. The agreement put a halt on Iran‘s nuclear program, making it almost impossible to build a nuclear weapon for at least fifteen years. In exchange Iran received sanctions relief and the end of international isolation, which is by many described as too little for a concession this big. The decision, made by Iran, to agree to the terms of P5+1 is interesting because Iran held a strong position and denied any guilt for decades, and then agreed to terms that by some scholars are even described as discriminatory. Naturally, one explanation for this sudden change of behavior is the effect of economic sanctions put forward by the West. Nevertheless, this argument has been criticized by many scholars, saying that sanctions are an ineffective tool for a goal this big. Furthermore, Iran itself has repeatedly denied any effect made by the sanctions, also, there is proof that the Iranian economy is struggling not because of the sanctions, but because of great mismanagement and corruption. Therefore, it is very important to analyze whether and how sanctions led to the signing of JCPOA. In the literature about Iran‘s sanctions and the sanctions theory I have found a few criteria, that sanctions have to meet to reach their final goals and be considered effective. The three most used arguments were that, firstly, the sanctions regime must have very clear and narrow goals that are not overly ambitious; secondly, that sanctions are unable to reach their goal without incentivizing the target, therefore there has to be additional instruments used in order for sanctions to work; thirdly, that there must be international cooperation in order for sanctions to have a real bite and generate concessions. Therefore, my purpose in this paper is, by using the process tracing method, to test these theories and check whether they provide an explanation for the link between economic sanctions and the signing of JCPOA, and whether the sanctions for Iran could be considered effective. After the analysis, I have found that only the first two theories hold in this case. Narrowing, clarification and making the goal less ambitious by the Obama administration was vital in making the sanctions regime better structured and effective. Additional tools, such as diplomacy and economic incentives for Iran were also an extremely important tool in forcing Iran to negotiate and generating concessions. I have noticed that previous administrations withheld incentives until Iran complied and did not offer appropriate compensation, therefore the negotiations stalled. Lastly, I have found that in this case, broad international cooperation was not important for trying to reach an agreement. Multilateral sanctions had little effect since they are usually weak. In this case, unilateral sanctions were much more important and had a bigger effect on trying to force Iran to halt its nuclear activities.

Degree

thesis:*
Grantor dc:publisher
Institutional Repository of Vilnius University
Year dc:date
2017

Author and committee

dc:creator, dc:contributor.*
Author dc:creator
  • Zabitytė, Deimantė,
Contributors dc:contributor
  • Jonavičius, Laurynas

Rights

dc:rights
Statement dc:rights
  • info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
Language dc:language
lit

Identifiers

dc:identifier.*

Chain of custody

source
Harvested from
Vilnius University
Base URL
epublications.vu.lt/oai
Last updated
2026-11-19
Source record
OAI-PMH GetRecord
related terms
citation

Zabitytė, Deimantė,. Iranas be urano: kodėl Iranas atsisakė branduolinės programos /. Institutional Repository of Vilnius University, 2017. https://repository.vu.lt/VU:ELABAETD35408426&prefLang=en_US