Institutional Repository of Vilnius University
Pritaikyto atgrasymo strategija: NATO klaidos Rusijos atžvilgiu /
Abstract
dc:descriptionTailored Deterrence: NATO Mistakes in Deterring Russia Since the end of Cold War, Western Countries via NATO had proposed both communication and cooperation to Russian Federation. Despite that, Russia breached the international law twice, first in Georgia and later in Ukraine, thus undermining Western offers. During the 2014 Wales summit which happened after the beginning of Ukraine Crisis, NATO has condemned Russian actions and switched the general tone from cooperation and communication to deterrence and started implementing strategic methods to deter Russia from further aggression. This raises the question – since Russia managed to undermine the earlier defense methods and institutions twice, would the upcoming strategies be effective? The main objective of this research is to evaluate NATO strategies created and implemented to deter Russia from aggressive actions. To simplify the work, the objective was divided into three questions, main question being about which of the NATO actions regarding Russia‘s deterrence can be ineffective, and side questions concerning Russian cultural variables affecting decision-making and which NATO actions between Wales Summit in 2014 to Warsaw Summit in 2016 are used to deter Russia. In order to answer these questions both third generation strategic culture and tailored deterrence doctrines are used as a theoretical basis. According to them, each country has it‘s own cultural symbols that can potentially affect decision-making process. To evaluate NATO‘s strategies there is a need to find the aforementioned Russian cultural symbols that can potentially affect Russian strategic decisions. Four symbols were found – expansionism, imperial syndrome, status and Russian patience. NATO decisions and actions regarding Russia in the aforementioned timepiece were reviewed, mostly consisting of condemnation of Russia‘s actions and creating deterrence methods, such as upgrades to quick response forces, creation of new forces, and deployment of troops in ally countries. In the end, each of the cultural variables were evaluated by stating what could be done to deter each one of them, and compared with NATO deterrence methods. To conclude, NATO has managed to deter only 2 of the variables fully, one of them half-by-half with European Union‘s help and the final one was impossible to deter. Both expansionism and imperial syndrome were deterred by troop deployments in ally countries and crisis response forces, with imperial syndrome also being deterred by hybrid warfare prevention measures. Status is impossible to deter by it‘s nature, since any anti-Russian deterrence action insults the status by default. Russian patience is deterred with not stating the expiration date for deterrence methods, and mentioning that the West is ready for negotiations with Russia once it stops breaching the international law, with EU providing sanctions causing difficulties for Russia. End recommendations for future academic work consist of looking deeper into Russian status as a cultural symbol and finding potential ways to deter it, and analysing Russian strategic culture for more cultural variables that could be used to tailor deterrence strategy even more accurately.
Degree
thesis:*- Grantor dc:publisher
- Institutional Repository of Vilnius University
- Year dc:date
- 2017
Author and committee
dc:creator, dc:contributor.*- Author dc:creator
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- Bogdanskis, Mantas,
- Contributors dc:contributor
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- Šlekys, Deividas
Rights
dc:rights- Statement dc:rights
-
- info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
- Language dc:language
- lit
Identifiers
dc:identifier.*- Repository record dc:identifier
- https://repository.vu.lt/VU:ELABAETD35474779&prefLang=en_US