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University of Washington

Venture Capital Directors, Earnings Manipulation, & Firm Performance

Abstract

dc:description.abstract

The accounting system allows for flexibility in how earnings are presented, and this flexibility is susceptible to the incentives for managers and controlling stakeholders. Venture Capital (VC) firms have competing incentives when it comes to bringing portfolio firms public at an initial public offering (IPO), and the power that VC directors exert over the firm allows them to control policies set by the firm, including the disclosure of earnings. VC firm investors typically do not liquidate their holdings in portfolio firms until more than a year after the IPO, which means VC directors have an incentive to bring only high quality portfolio firms public. However, VC directors also have an incentive to bring portfolio firms to market faster, i.e., to "grandstand." This dissertation looks to social networks of VC directors to explain earnings manipulation and, in turn, firm performance more than a year after IPO. My purpose is to demonstrate how social networks determine the dominating incentives and how social networks influence the relationship between earnings manipulation at IPO and firm performance more than a year afterward. The main premise of my dissertation is that embeddedness, or the degree to which individuals and organizations are connected, influences malfeasance.

Author and committee

dc:creator, dc:contributor.*
Author dc:creator
  • Fleming, Brandon Edward
Advisor dc:contributor.advisor
  • Boeker, Warren

Subjects

dc:subject × 4

Rights

dc:rights
Statement dc:rights
  • Copyright is held by the individual authors.
Language dc:language.iso
en_US

Identifiers

dc:identifier.*
Handle dc:identifier.uri
http://hdl.handle.net/1773/20261

Chain of custody

source
Harvested from
University of Washington
Base URL
digital.lib.washington.edu/server/oai/request
Last updated
2026-11-18
Source record
OAI-PMH GetRecord
citation

Fleming, Brandon Edward. Venture Capital Directors, Earnings Manipulation, & Firm Performance. 2012. http://hdl.handle.net/1773/20261