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University of Washington

Essays on Contract Theory and Mechanism Design

Abstract

dc:description.abstract

My dissertation investigates optimal contracts for experimentation and a matching problem for the runway slot allocation. The first chapter of my dissertation examines the role of monitoring in experimentation where agents may observe success privately. In the benchmark model without monitoring, private observability of success is inconsequential as the agent never wants to delay announcing success. However, with monitoring of the agent's effort, private observability of success plays a role in choosing the optimal time for monitoring. When success is observed publicly, the optimal time for a principal to hire a monitor is at the start of the relationship. On the contrary, if the agent observes success privately, and the discount factor is high enough, monitoring is performed during the final period. The second chapter discusses optimal contracts for both experimentation and production. It can be optimal to pay a rent after failure and over experimentation can be optimal. Over production can occur in the exploitation phase. The third chapter considers a financially significant matching problem that emerges when inclement weather conditions strike an airport and runway slots must be reallocated.

Author and committee

dc:creator, dc:contributor.*
Author dc:creator
  • Rodivilov, Alexander
Advisors dc:contributor.advisor
  • Khalil, Fahad
  • Lawarree, Jacques

Subjects

dc:subject × 7

Rights

dc:rights
Statement dc:rights
  • none
Language dc:language.iso
en_US

Identifiers

dc:identifier.*
Handle dc:identifier.uri
http://hdl.handle.net/1773/40035

Chain of custody

source
Harvested from
University of Washington
Base URL
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Last updated
2026-11-18
Source record
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citation

Rodivilov, Alexander. Essays on Contract Theory and Mechanism Design. 2017. http://hdl.handle.net/1773/40035