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University of Washington

Do Commissions Cause Investment Adviser Misconduct?

Abstract

dc:description.abstract

Sales commissions may present a conflict of interest that allows investment advisers to obtain rents from uninformed clients. Alternatively, commissions might be a contracting solution to motivate information provision. To analyze the relation between commissions and adviser misconduct, I exploit quasi-exogenous changes in individual investment advisers' compensation arrangements caused by mergers between large registered investment advisory firms. The opportunity to earn sales commissions increases the probability that an adviser engages in misconduct, but competition is an important mediator. In regions with greater competition, sales commissions decrease misconduct claims. Increased misconduct from commissions is concentrated among low-experience advisers and male advisers. Damages paid out in claims involving commission-motivated advisers are $25,013 (36%) greater than other claims. The experimental design rules out latent firm and market explanations. Overall, I find that the connection between conflicts of interest and information provision depends on the competitive environment.

Author and committee

dc:creator, dc:contributor.*
Author dc:creator
  • Patel, Tarun Dinesh
Advisor dc:contributor.advisor
  • Duchin, Ran

Subjects

dc:subject × 8

Rights

dc:rights
Statement dc:rights
  • none
Language dc:language.iso
en_US

Identifiers

dc:identifier.*
Handle dc:identifier.uri
http://hdl.handle.net/1773/45871

Chain of custody

source
Harvested from
University of Washington
Base URL
digital.lib.washington.edu/server/oai/request
Last updated
2026-11-18
Source record
OAI-PMH GetRecord
citation

Patel, Tarun Dinesh. Do Commissions Cause Investment Adviser Misconduct?. 2020. http://hdl.handle.net/1773/45871