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University of Waterloo

Randomized Lempel-Ziv Compression for Anti-Compression Side-Channel Attacks

Abstract

dc:description.abstract

Security experts confront new attacks on TLS/SSL every year. Ever since the compression side-channel attacks CRIME and BREACH were presented during security conferences in 2012 and 2013, online users connecting to HTTP servers that run TLS version 1.2 are susceptible of being impersonated. We set up three Randomized Lempel-Ziv Models, which are built on Lempel-Ziv77, to confront this attack. Our three models change the deterministic characteristic of the compression algorithm: each compression with the same input gives output of different lengths. We implemented SSL/TLS protocol and the Lempel-Ziv77 compression algorithm, and used them as a base for our simulations of compression side-channel attack. After performing the simulations, all three models successfully prevented the attack. However, we demonstrate that our randomized models can still be broken by a stronger version of compression side-channel attack that we created. But this latter attack has a greater time complexity and is easily detectable. Finally, from the results, we conclude that our models couldn't compress as well as Lempel-Ziv77, but they can be used against compression side-channel attacks.

Degree

thesis:*
Grantor dc:publisher
University of Waterloo
Year dc:date.issued
2018

Author and committee

dc:creator, dc:contributor.*
Author dc:creator
  • Yang, Meng
Advisor dc:contributor.advisor
  • Guang, Gong

Subjects

dc:subject × 5

Rights

Language dc:language.iso
en

Identifiers

dc:identifier.*
Handle dc:identifier.uri
http://hdl.handle.net/10012/12974

Chain of custody

source
Harvested from
University of Waterloo
Base URL
dspacemainprd01.lib.uwaterloo.ca/server/oai/request
Last updated
2026-11-19
Source record
OAI-PMH GetRecord
citation

Yang, Meng. Randomized Lempel-Ziv Compression for Anti-Compression Side-Channel Attacks. University of Waterloo, 2018. http://hdl.handle.net/10012/12974