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University of Waterloo

Dine and Dash: A Test of Criminological Theory

Abstract

dc:description.abstract

No known research has tested the etiological processes underlying “dining and dashing,” an act that has substantial financial implications for the restaurant industry. Dine and dash is defined as people using a food and/or beverage service that is expected to be paid for and leaving the premises with no intention of returning to pay. Predictors were drawn from social learning, rational choice, and social control theories. Using a survey sample of 358 undergraduate and graduate students from a Canadian university, we found partial support for social learning and rational choice theories. Individuals who knew someone else who had dined and dashed were more likely to dine and dash themselves (social learning theory) (OR=11.58, p<0.001). When an individual thought they would suffer consequences (e.g., paying a fine), they were less likely to dine and dash (rational choice theory) (OR=0.77, p<0.001). Lastly, individuals who committed a dine and dash were more likely to report that target hardening measures (e.g., security cameras) played a role in their decision to commit the act (OR=1.13, p=0.012) which suggests they were more situationally aware. No variables drawn from social control theory were related to dining and dashing.

Degree

thesis:*
Grantor dc:publisher
University of Waterloo
Year dc:date.issued
2018

Author and committee

dc:creator, dc:contributor.*
Author dc:creator
  • Ryan, Ashley
Advisor dc:contributor.advisor
  • Gallupe, Owen

Subjects

dc:subject × 6

Rights

Language dc:language.iso
en

Identifiers

dc:identifier.*
Handle dc:identifier.uri
http://hdl.handle.net/10012/13615

Chain of custody

source
Harvested from
University of Waterloo
Base URL
dspacemainprd01.lib.uwaterloo.ca/server/oai/request
Last updated
2026-11-19
Source record
OAI-PMH GetRecord
citation

Ryan, Ashley. Dine and Dash: A Test of Criminological Theory. University of Waterloo, 2018. http://hdl.handle.net/10012/13615