University of Waterloo
Environmental taxation: The impact of carbon tax policy commitment on technology choice and social welfare
Abstract
dc:description.abstractMotivated by multiple real-world settings, we determine a social welfare-maximizing regulator’s tax policies that induce a profit-maximizing polluting firm to make green technology choices. Using a game-theoretic approach we compare the optimal tax and social welfare over two periods under two scenarios: (1) a regulator committing to a tax level for both periods at the beginning of the first period; (2) a regulator who sets the same tax at the beginning of each period without disclosing this information to the firm (i.e. the firm is not aware of the second period tax in the first period). We find that regulators can achieve a higher social welfare when two-period commitments are made. Moreover, the outcomes in the commitment policy are less sensitive to small deviations in the optimal tax level.
Degree
thesis:*- Grantor dc:publisher
- University of Waterloo
- Year dc:date.issued
- 2020
Author and committee
dc:creator, dc:contributor.*- Author dc:creator
-
- Rustico, Erica
- Advisor dc:contributor.advisor
-
- Dimitrov, Stanko
Subjects
dc:subject × 6Rights
- Language dc:language.iso
- en
Identifiers
dc:identifier.*- Handle dc:identifier.uri
- http://hdl.handle.net/10012/16567