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University of Waterloo

Identity and Security in 5G Authentication

Abstract

dc:description.abstract

In this thesis, we study the provision and protection of user identity in the 5G Authentication and Key Agreement (5G-AKA) protocol. We present two variations of the protocol: the first mitigates a family of de-anonymization attacks that aim to defeat the privacy-protection features of 5G-AKA. It does so by replacing a fixed user identity with a sequence of ephemeral identifiers. This variant is designed to be fully backwards compatible with the existing 5G-AKA authentication message formats, which allows it to be used in roaming scenarios without changes to the visited network. The second protocol is a realization of "Bring Your Own Identity" (BYOI) for 5G-AKA, allowing subscribers to authenticate with an identity provisioned by an external provider. This is accomplished by composing 5G-AKA with OAuth 2.0, a de-facto standard for third-party authorization online. We built and verified a formal model of each protocol using Tamarin, a theorem-prover tool for security protocols. From this, we note some limitations of existing formalizations of secrecy and authentication properties, and propose improvements. Finally, we present an implementation of our BYOI protocol over a simulated 5G system, and show it works against Google's OAuth 2.0 API. We discuss some practical considerations arising from the implementation.

Degree

thesis:*
Grantor dc:publisher
University of Waterloo
Year dc:date.issued
2024

Author and committee

dc:creator, dc:contributor.*
Author dc:creator
  • Parkin, Julian
Advisor dc:contributor.advisor
  • Tripunitara, Mahesh

Subjects

dc:subject × 6

Rights

Language dc:language.iso
en

Identifiers

dc:identifier.*
Handle dc:identifier.uri
https://hdl.handle.net/10012/20834

Chain of custody

source
Harvested from
University of Waterloo
Base URL
dspacemainprd01.lib.uwaterloo.ca/server/oai/request
Last updated
2026-11-19
Source record
OAI-PMH GetRecord
citation

Parkin, Julian. Identity and Security in 5G Authentication. University of Waterloo, 2024. https://hdl.handle.net/10012/20834