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University of Waterloo

Sentimentalism, Affective Response, and the Justification of Normative Moral Judgments

Abstract

dc:description.abstract

Sentimentalism as an ethical view makes a particular claim about moral judgment: to judge that something is right/wrong is to have a sentiment/emotion of approbation/disapprobation, or some kind of positive/negative feeling, toward that thing. However, several sentimentalists have argued that moral judgments involve not only having a specific kind of feelings or emotional responses, but judging that one would be <em>justified</em> in having that feeling or emotional response. In the literature, some authors have taken up the former position because the empirical data on moral judgment seems to suggest that justification is not a necessary prerequisite for making a moral judgment. Even if this is true, however, I argue that justifying moral judgments is still an important philosophic endeavour, and that developing an empirically constrained account of how a person might go about justifying his feelings/emotional responses as reasons for rendering (normative) moral judgments by using a coherentist method of justification is both plausible and desirable.

Degree

thesis:*
Grantor dc:publisher
University of Waterloo
Year dc:date.issued
2006

Author and committee

dc:creator, dc:contributor.*
Author dc:creator
  • Menken, Kyle

Subjects

dc:subject × 7

Rights

dc:rights
Statement dc:rights
  • Copyright: 2006, Menken, Kyle. All rights reserved.
Language dc:language.iso
en

Identifiers

dc:identifier.*
Handle dc:identifier.uri
http://hdl.handle.net/10012/2817

Chain of custody

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University of Waterloo
Base URL
dspacemainprd01.lib.uwaterloo.ca/server/oai/request
Last updated
2026-11-19
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citation

Menken, Kyle. Sentimentalism, Affective Response, and the Justification of Normative Moral Judgments. University of Waterloo, 2006. http://hdl.handle.net/10012/2817