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University of Waterloo

How incentive contracts and task complexity influence and facilitate long-term performance

Abstract

dc:description.abstract

The purpose of this study is to investigate how different incentive contracts that include forward-looking and contemporaneous goals motivate managers to make decisions consistent with the organization’s long-term objectives, in tasks of varying complexity. Two research questions are addressed. First, in a long-term horizon setting, how do incentive contracts based on various combinations of forward-looking and contemporaneous measures influence decisions? Second, how does task complexity influence the expected effect of various incentive contracts on management decisions? I address my research questions using a multi-period experiment where I compare the effects of three different incentive structure types and two different levels of task complexity. Results show that in a low complexity task, individuals perform better when only contemporaneous goal attainment is rewarded in the incentive contract than when both forward-looking and contemporaneous goal attainment is rewarded. In a high complexity task, individuals perform better when both contemporaneous and forward-looking goal attainment is rewarded, but only when the contemporaneous goal attainment is weighted more heavily in the incentive contract. My research contributes to the existing literature in two ways. First, this is the first study of which I am aware that compares the performance effects of long-term incentive contracts that reward forward-looking and contemporaneous goal attainment. Second, this study is the first of which I am aware to experimentally test incentive contracts, for employees with a long-term horizon, that incorporate various weightings of forward-looking measures in the contract. In addition, this study will be amongst the first to examine the impact of task complexity on incentive contract effectiveness.

Degree

thesis:*
Grantor dc:publisher
University of Waterloo
Year dc:date.issued
2009

Author and committee

dc:creator, dc:contributor.*
Author dc:creator
  • Berger, Leslie

Subjects

dc:subject × 5

Rights

Language dc:language.iso
en

Identifiers

dc:identifier.*
Handle dc:identifier.uri
http://hdl.handle.net/10012/4538

Chain of custody

source
Harvested from
University of Waterloo
Base URL
dspacemainprd01.lib.uwaterloo.ca/server/oai/request
Last updated
2026-11-19
Source record
OAI-PMH GetRecord
citation

Berger, Leslie. How incentive contracts and task complexity influence and facilitate long-term performance. University of Waterloo, 2009. http://hdl.handle.net/10012/4538