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University of Waterloo

Financial Fraud: A Game of Cat and Mouse

Abstract

dc:description.abstract

This thesis models rational criminals and regulators with flawed incentives. In it we develop a rational model of crime and regulation that we use to show the SEC's current incentive structure is ineffective at preventing fraud. Under our model, criminals balance the monetary rewards of larger frauds against an increased chance of being apprehended; and regulators design regulations to minimize either the damage caused by fraud or some other metric. We show that under this model, the SEC's focus on 'stats' and 'quick hits' leads to large frauds and a large social loss. We argue that regulators need to focus not just on successful prosecutions, but also on harm reduction and deterrence.

Degree

thesis:*
Grantor dc:publisher
University of Waterloo
Year dc:date.issued
2010

Author and committee

dc:creator, dc:contributor.*
Author dc:creator
  • Gornall, William

Subjects

dc:subject × 2

Rights

Language dc:language.iso
en

Identifiers

dc:identifier.*
Handle dc:identifier.uri
http://hdl.handle.net/10012/5261

Chain of custody

source
Harvested from
University of Waterloo
Base URL
dspacemainprd01.lib.uwaterloo.ca/server/oai/request
Last updated
2026-11-19
Source record
OAI-PMH GetRecord
citation

Gornall, William. Financial Fraud: A Game of Cat and Mouse. University of Waterloo, 2010. http://hdl.handle.net/10012/5261