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University of Waterloo

On the Security of Leakage Resilient Public Key Cryptography

Abstract

dc:description.abstract

Side channel attacks, where an attacker learns some physical information about the state of a device, are one of the ways in which cryptographic schemes are broken in practice. "Provably secure" schemes are subject to these attacks since the traditional models of security do not account for them. The theoretical community has recently proposed leakage resilient cryptography in an effort to account for side channel attacks in the security model. This thesis provides an in-depth look into what security guarantees public key leakage resilient schemes provide in practice.

Degree

thesis:*
Grantor dc:publisher
University of Waterloo
Year dc:date.issued
2012

Author and committee

dc:creator, dc:contributor.*
Author dc:creator
  • Brydon, Dale

Subjects

dc:subject × 2

Rights

Language dc:language.iso
en

Identifiers

dc:identifier.*
Handle dc:identifier.uri
http://hdl.handle.net/10012/6676

Chain of custody

source
Harvested from
University of Waterloo
Base URL
dspacemainprd01.lib.uwaterloo.ca/server/oai/request
Last updated
2026-11-19
Source record
OAI-PMH GetRecord
citation

Brydon, Dale. On the Security of Leakage Resilient Public Key Cryptography. University of Waterloo, 2012. http://hdl.handle.net/10012/6676