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University of Leeds

The epistemology of abstractionism

Abstract

dc:description.abstract

I examine the nature and the structure of basic logico-mathematical knowledge. What justifies the truth of the Dedekind-Peano axioms and the validity of Modus Ponens? And is the justification we possess reflectively available? To make progress with these questions, I ultimately embed Hale's and Wright's neo-Fregeanism in a general internalistic epistemological framework. In Part I, I provide an introduction to the problems in the philosophy of mathematics to motivate the investigations to follow. I present desiderata for a fully satisfactory epistemology of mathematics and discuss relevant positions. All these positions turn out to be unsatisfactory, which motivates the abstractionist approach. I argue that abstractionism is in need of further explication when it comes to its central epistemological workings. I fill this gap by embedding neo-Fregeanism in an internalistic epistemological framework. In Part 11, I motivate, outline, and discuss the consequences of the frame- work. I argue: (1) we need an internalistic notion of warrant in our epistemology and every good epistemology accounts for the possession of such warrant; (2) to avoid scepticism, we need to invoke a notion of non-evidential warrant (entitlement); (3) because entitlements cannot be upgraded, endorsing entitlements for mathematical axioms and validity claims would entail that such propositions cannot be claimed to be known. Because of (3), the framework appears to yield sceptical consequences. In Part 111, I discuss (i) whether we can accept these consequences and (ii) whether we have to accept these consequences. As to (i), I argue that there is a tenable solely entitlement- based philosophy of mathematics and logic. However, I also argue that we can over- come limitations by vindicating the neo-Fregean proposal that implicit definitions can underwrite basic logico-mathematical knowledge. One key manoeuvre here is to acknowledge that the semantic success of creative implicit definitions rests on substantial presuppositions - but to argue that relevant presuppositions are entitlements.

Degree

thesis:*
Name dc:type.qualificationname
Ph.D
Level dc:type.qualificationlevel
doctoral
Grantor dc:publisher.institution
University of Leeds
Year dc:date.issued
2012

Author and committee

dc:creator, dc:contributor.*
Author dc:creator
  • Oldemeier, Alexander Christoph Reinhard
Advisors dc:contributor.advisor
  • Williams, Robbie
  • Divers, John

Rights

Language dc:language.dcterms_iso639_2
eng

Identifiers

dc:identifier.*
Identifier
uk.bl.ethos.581861

Chain of custody

source
Harvested from
White Rose University Consortium
Base URL
etheses.whiterose.ac.uk/cgi/oai2
Last updated
2026-11-18
Source record
OAI-PMH GetRecord
related terms
citation

Oldemeier, Alexander Christoph Reinhard. The epistemology of abstractionism. doctoral thesis, University of Leeds, 2012.