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University of York

Managerial overconfidence and corporate policy decisions in UK Ccpanies

Abstract

dc:description.abstract

Managerial overconfidence, as a particular form of managerial irrationality, concerns that some managers are less than completely rational and tend to overestimate the outcome of the investment projects under their control. This study focuses on the impact of managerial overconfidence on corporate policy decisions. There are two main objectives. First, it explores the consequences of managerial overconfidence for investment decisions and the cash holding policy by emphasizing the role of financial constraints. Second, it investigates the potential role of managerial overconfidence in determining debt maturity. Using an original and very detailed dataset for a large sample of UK listed firms, we show that investment by overconfident managers tend to be more sensitive to internal funds in financially constrained firms identified by leverage, dividend, age and cash. Meanwhile, a cash holding policy can be associated with investment decision by overconfident managers. We argue that, though investment can increase cash flow sensitivity of cash in financially constrained fines identified by leverage and dividend, managerial overconfidence can reduce this positive relationship. Moreover, managerial overconfidence can induce a biased debt maturity structure. It seems that overconfident managers can take advantage of short-term debt to signal their perceived firms' quality to the market. Hence, firms with managerial overconfidence tend to increase the negative relationship between long-term debt and firms' quality. Finally, we find that the impact of managerial overconfidence on corporate decision can also vary with different corporate governance mechanisms. We show that the impact of managerial overconfidence on corporate policies in firms with weak corporate governance mechanisms (i. e. lower ratio of non-executive directors in boards, lower blockholders' ownership) is pronounced, whereas, in firms with good corporate governance mechanisms, it turns to be insignificant.

Degree

thesis:*
Name dc:type.qualificationname
Ph.D
Level dc:type.qualificationlevel
doctoral
Grantor dc:publisher.institution
University of York
Year dc:date.issued
2008

Author and committee

dc:creator, dc:contributor.*
Author dc:creator
  • Zhou, Jie

Rights

Language dc:language.dcterms_iso639_2
eng

Identifiers

dc:identifier.*
Identifier
uk.bl.ethos.507492

Chain of custody

source
Harvested from
White Rose University Consortium
Base URL
etheses.whiterose.ac.uk/cgi/oai2
Last updated
2026-11-18
Source record
OAI-PMH GetRecord
related terms
citation

Zhou, Jie. Managerial overconfidence and corporate policy decisions in UK Ccpanies. doctoral thesis, University of York, 2008.