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University of York

Three Essays on the Design of Kidney Exchange and Doctor-Hospital Matching Mechanisms

Abstract

dc:description.abstract

The thesis addresses the problem of the significant shortage of kidneys from donors as well as that of the imbalanced distribution of doctors. In respect to the kidney exchange problem, we propose a general model in which there are a finite number of patient-donor pairs, patients on the waiting list, and single donors. In the first study, patients have general preferences. The kidney of each paired donor is regarded as a private property of the intended kidney recipient, while kidneys from single donors are publicly owned. We propose an appropriate modification of the classic solution of core to the current model and develop a mechanism for finding a core matching that is Pareto optimal and stable against any coalition deviation. The second study focuses on efficient exchange procedures with dichotomous preferences in which only one-way, two-way, three or four-way chains, or cycles of exchange, are used. We derive a tight upper bound of the possible number of feasible kidney transplants in each case of exchange and provide important simulation results. We find that two-way cycles and chains of exchange can substantially increase the number of feasible transplants, that three-way cycles and chains can have a visible effect, and, at most, four-way cycles and chains suffice to capture all the potential gains of exchange. Our results are not only theoretically interesting but also have meaningful policy implications. The third study moves to the doctor-hospital matching problem. This paper studies a general doctor-hospital model under distributional and hierarchical constraints. We find that a matching that satisfies the classic concept of stability does not always exist and hence introduce an appropriate modification of the concept of stability. We furthermore design a doctor-proposing deferred acceptance mechanism with appealing properties in that it is efficient, stable and strategy-proof for doctors.

Degree

thesis:*
Name dc:type.qualificationname
Ph.D
Level dc:type.qualificationlevel
doctoral
Grantor dc:publisher.institution
University of York
Year dc:date.issued
2017

Author and committee

dc:creator, dc:contributor.*
Author dc:creator
  • Cheng, Yao
Advisor dc:contributor.advisor
  • Yang, Zaifu

Rights

Language dc:language.dcterms_iso639_2
eng

Identifiers

dc:identifier.*
Identifier
uk.bl.ethos.736601

Chain of custody

source
Harvested from
White Rose University Consortium
Base URL
etheses.whiterose.ac.uk/cgi/oai2
Last updated
2026-11-18
Source record
OAI-PMH GetRecord
related terms
citation

Cheng, Yao. Three Essays on the Design of Kidney Exchange and Doctor-Hospital Matching Mechanisms. doctoral thesis, University of York, 2017.