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University of Sheffield

Bad Judgement: An Essay in Vice Epistemology

Abstract

dc:description.abstract

This thesis provides an account of the nature of intellectual vice. An intellectual vice is an aspect of someone’s character that makes them a bad intellectual agent, or bad knower. Previous accounts of the intellectual vices have tended to identify them with either the disposition to have bad epistemic motivations, or the disposition to produce bad epistemic effects. I argue for a new view that can overcome the difficulties faced by both of these accounts. According to this view, there are two distinct forms of intellectual vice: vices that involve motivations towards bad epistemic ends, and vices that involve some entrenched pattern of bad judgement.

Degree

thesis:*
Name dc:type.qualificationname
Ph.D
Level dc:type.qualificationlevel
doctoral
Grantor dc:publisher.institution
University of Sheffield
Year dc:date.issued
2018

Author and committee

dc:creator, dc:contributor.*
Author dc:creator
  • Crerar, Charlie
Advisors dc:contributor.advisor
  • Fricker, Miranda
  • Holroyd, Jules

Rights

Language dc:language.dcterms_iso639_2
eng

Identifiers

dc:identifier.*
Identifier
uk.bl.ethos.755178

Chain of custody

source
Harvested from
White Rose University Consortium
Base URL
etheses.whiterose.ac.uk/cgi/oai2
Last updated
2026-11-18
Source record
OAI-PMH GetRecord
related terms
citation

Crerar, Charlie. Bad Judgement: An Essay in Vice Epistemology. doctoral thesis, University of Sheffield, 2018.