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University of Leeds

The Epistemic and Moral Value of Empathy

Abstract

dc:description.abstract

In this thesis I present and defend an account of empathy and then use this account to evaluate the epistemic and moral worth of empathy. I understand empathy as the activity of recreating in one’s imagination another’s experience, a recreation which does not necessarily imply an isomorphism between the states of empathiser and target. I understand empathy as a tool which one can become skilled at using. I then go on to argue that empathy so construed has epistemic value. I argue that recreating in one’s imagination certain aspects of another’s experience allows one to learn about other, unknown, aspects of the other’s experience. Then I argue that empathy also has epistemic value for learning about evaluative features of objects; it is like testimony without the middle man. I am also concerned with the moral value of empathy. I argue that empathy is a morally neutral tool that can be used to moral advantage. I present and assess the existent criticisms of empathy’s moral worth, as well as put forward a criticism of my own. Apart from discussing criticisms, I also make a positive case by arguing that empathy has moral value in three ways: it allows us to make better informed decisions, it increases our motivation to bring about the good to others, and it brings about a valuable kind of togetherness.

Degree

thesis:*
Name dc:type.qualificationname
Ph.D
Level dc:type.qualificationlevel
doctoral
Grantor dc:publisher.institution
University of Leeds
Year dc:date.issued
2018

Author and committee

dc:creator, dc:contributor.*
Author dc:creator
  • Sofronieva, Diana
Advisors dc:contributor.advisor
  • Dow, Jamie
  • Meskin, Aaron

Rights

Language dc:language.dcterms_iso639_2
eng

Identifiers

dc:identifier.*
Identifier
uk.bl.ethos.778613

Chain of custody

source
Harvested from
White Rose University Consortium
Base URL
etheses.whiterose.ac.uk/cgi/oai2
Last updated
2026-11-18
Source record
OAI-PMH GetRecord
related terms
citation

Sofronieva, Diana. The Epistemic and Moral Value of Empathy. doctoral thesis, University of Leeds, 2018.