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University of Sheffield

General Argument against Ethical Naturalism

Abstract

dc:description.abstract

Ethical naturalists argue that normative properties are, in some sense, nothing over and above natural properties. Some philosophers think that all forms of naturalism must fail. They present, what Jonathan Dancy calls, ‘Blockbuster arguments’, which they think rule out every kind of naturalism. In this thesis I argue that these arguments do not succeed. In the first two chapters, I argue that both analytic and synthetic naturalists have good responses to G.E. Moore’s open question argument. Derek Parfit, as well as other non-naturalists, have presented a number of supposedly separate arguments against naturalism which are not meant to rely on any considerations about meaning; I argue against these in chapters 3 and 4. Non-cognitivists argue that all descriptivist theories like naturalism fail to explain the necessary connection between normative judgements and motivation. I argue, in an oblique way, that the kind of motivational internalism needed to ground this argument is not a threat to naturalism in chapter 5. In chapter 6, I turn to what I take to be more serious problems for naturalists arising from Terry Horgan and Mark Timmons’ Moral Twin Earth thought experiments. I argue first that tackling these thought experiments is a problem that all major metaethical theories share. The fact that everyone needs to address these problems makes more palatable the responses I then go on to develop. First, I argue that we might be able to accommodate these cases if we accept that people can disagree even if the semantic content of their utterances are not logically inconsistent. Second, I argue that we can debunk the intuitions that Moral Twin Earth cases are supposed to pump. I end by summarising what I have argued in the thesis.

Degree

thesis:*
Name dc:type.qualificationname
Ph.D
Level dc:type.qualificationlevel
doctoral
Grantor dc:publisher.institution
University of Sheffield
Year dc:date.issued
2019

Author and committee

dc:creator, dc:contributor.*
Author dc:creator
  • Brooks, Lewis
Advisors dc:contributor.advisor
  • Lenman, James
  • Shemmer, Yonatan

Rights

Language dc:language.dcterms_iso639_2
eng

Identifiers

dc:identifier.*
Identifier
uk.bl.ethos.811284

Chain of custody

source
Harvested from
White Rose University Consortium
Base URL
etheses.whiterose.ac.uk/cgi/oai2
Last updated
2026-11-18
Source record
OAI-PMH GetRecord
related terms
citation

Brooks, Lewis. General Argument against Ethical Naturalism. doctoral thesis, University of Sheffield, 2019.