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University of Leeds

Against Moral Deference

Abstract

dc:description.abstract

Is there a problem if you form the belief that capital punishment is morally wrong by deferring to a reliable moral expert? While deferring to your professor about facts concerning physics seems fine, deferring about the morality of capital punishment triggers negative intuitions. In this thesis, I examine these intuitions and investigate whether there are any non-epistemic reasons to not defer about moral matters. I construct and defend a new variety of moral deference pessimism, the view that there is something problematic about forming and sustaining moral beliefs, or about acting, on the basis of moral testimony. My account proposes that recurrent moral deference, i.e. moral deference that happens repeatedly, is pro tanto bad insofar as, and to the extent that, it interferes with the exercise and development of our capacity for practical deliberation. This interference occurs as instances of practical deliberation are being replaced with deference. Thus, when we defer, we do not exercise and do not develop our capacity for practical deliberation. This is pro tanto bad because this capacity has instrumental and extrinsic final value. My investigation starts with moral deference, but my practical deliberation view is able to offer a more comprehensive account, which covers other kinds of deference that seem suspicious, such as prudential and aesthetic deference. As such, this project aims to provide a systematic account of the pro tanto non-epistemic badness of deference, that is in broad accordance with our intuitions, both in morality and beyond.

Degree

thesis:*
Name dc:type.qualificationname
Ph.D
Level dc:type.qualificationlevel
doctoral
Grantor dc:publisher.institution
University of Leeds
Year dc:date.issued
2019

Author and committee

dc:creator, dc:contributor.*
Author dc:creator
  • Covaci, Adina Cristina
Advisor dc:contributor.advisor
  • Vayrynen, Pekka

Rights

Language dc:language.dcterms_iso639_2
eng

Identifiers

dc:identifier.*
Identifier
uk.bl.ethos.797967

Chain of custody

source
Harvested from
White Rose University Consortium
Base URL
etheses.whiterose.ac.uk/cgi/oai2
Last updated
2026-11-18
Source record
OAI-PMH GetRecord
related terms
citation

Covaci, Adina Cristina. Against Moral Deference. doctoral thesis, University of Leeds, 2019.