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University of Sheffield

Disagreement and Deep Disagreement: Should you trust yourself?

Abstract

dc:description.abstract

What, on realising disagreement, is an agent justified in believing when it comes to the substance of that disagreement? What significance ought we to afford disagreement in the practices by which we came to hold the beliefs over which we disagree? What do we do when the disagreement reaches down to the norms that determine the kinds of things we see as reasons for belief? In this thesis I employ the methodological lens of ‘peer disagreement’ to develop a response to these questions that I call the ‘Higher-Order Trust’ approach to disagreement. There are two important aspects to this position: First, I suggest that a satisfactory theory of disagreement must consider both ‘The Problem of Ordinary Disagreement’ – roughly, the question of how epistemic peers ought to respond when they disagree in so far as they hold conflicting beliefs – and ‘The Normative Problem of Deep Disagreement’ – roughly, the question of how peers ought to respond when a disagreement in beliefs is explained by the disputants following conflicting epistemic norms. Secondly, I suggest that the realisation of disagreement affords one higher-order evidence about the epistemic practices by which one came to hold the relevant beliefs. Thus, the question of how one ought to respond to the realisation of disagreement depends upon whether one has available some form of epistemic self-trust in the practices drawn into question. To understand the normative significance of disagreement, then, we first have to understand what it means to have epistemic self-trust. In this light, I suggest that there is a form of affective self-trust that can be available in cases of ordinary disagreement and realised deep disagreement between peers. When such trust is available, it may be rational to stay steadfast in the face of disagreement. Where it is not, one should respond in more conciliatory fashion.

Degree

thesis:*
Name dc:type.qualificationname
Ph.D
Level dc:type.qualificationlevel
doctoral
Grantor dc:publisher.institution
University of Sheffield
Year dc:date.issued
2019

Author and committee

dc:creator, dc:contributor.*
Author dc:creator
  • Barker, Simon
Advisors dc:contributor.advisor
  • Faulkner, P
  • Byerly, T R
  • Fricker, M F

Rights

Language dc:language.dcterms_iso639_2
eng

Identifiers

dc:identifier.*
Identifier
uk.bl.ethos.805402

Chain of custody

source
Harvested from
White Rose University Consortium
Base URL
etheses.whiterose.ac.uk/cgi/oai2
Last updated
2026-11-18
Source record
OAI-PMH GetRecord
related terms
citation

Barker, Simon. Disagreement and Deep Disagreement: Should you trust yourself?. doctoral thesis, University of Sheffield, 2019.