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University of York

Perceiving what must be: a new argument in favour of Naive Realism

Abstract

dc:description.abstract

I offer an original argument in favour of Naïve Realism, over Intentionalism. I shall argue that we visually experience: 1. Spatial composition relations, and 2., the metaphysical necessity of those composition relations. Naïve Realism is able to accommodate both 1. and 2., in a way that is consistent with our visual phenomenology. Representationalist versions of Intentionalism are unable to accommodate even 1., in a way that is consistent with our visual phenomenology, and other forms of Intentionalism have some trouble accounting for 1., in a way that is consistent with our visual phenomenology. No form of Intentionalism is able to accommodate 2., in a way that is consistent with our visual phenomenology. I will also develop the Naïve Realist account such that it is, for the first time, able to provide a satisfactory explanation of our perceptual experience of objects (as well as of properties).

Degree

thesis:*
Name dc:type.qualificationname
Ph.D
Level dc:type.qualificationlevel
doctoral
Grantor dc:publisher.institution
University of York
Year dc:date.issued
2020

Author and committee

dc:creator, dc:contributor.*
Author dc:creator
  • Courtney, Nicholas
Advisors dc:contributor.advisor
  • Richardson, Louise
  • Noordhof, Paul
ORCID person:identifier.orcid

Rights

Language dc:language.dcterms_iso639_2
eng

Identifiers

dc:identifier.*
Identifier
uk.bl.ethos.811453

Chain of custody

source
Harvested from
White Rose University Consortium
Base URL
etheses.whiterose.ac.uk/cgi/oai2
Last updated
2026-11-18
Source record
OAI-PMH GetRecord
related terms
citation

Courtney, Nicholas. Perceiving what must be: a new argument in favour of Naive Realism. doctoral thesis, University of York, 2020.