University of York
Perceiving what must be: a new argument in favour of Naive Realism
Abstract
dc:description.abstractI offer an original argument in favour of Naïve Realism, over Intentionalism. I shall argue that we visually experience: 1. Spatial composition relations, and 2., the metaphysical necessity of those composition relations. Naïve Realism is able to accommodate both 1. and 2., in a way that is consistent with our visual phenomenology. Representationalist versions of Intentionalism are unable to accommodate even 1., in a way that is consistent with our visual phenomenology, and other forms of Intentionalism have some trouble accounting for 1., in a way that is consistent with our visual phenomenology. No form of Intentionalism is able to accommodate 2., in a way that is consistent with our visual phenomenology. I will also develop the Naïve Realist account such that it is, for the first time, able to provide a satisfactory explanation of our perceptual experience of objects (as well as of properties).
Degree
thesis:*- Name dc:type.qualificationname
- Ph.D
- Level dc:type.qualificationlevel
- doctoral
- Grantor dc:publisher.institution
- University of York
- Year dc:date.issued
- 2020
Author and committee
dc:creator, dc:contributor.*- Author dc:creator
-
- Courtney, Nicholas
- Advisors dc:contributor.advisor
-
- Richardson, Louise
- Noordhof, Paul
- ORCID person:identifier.orcid
Rights
- Language dc:language.dcterms_iso639_2
- eng
Identifiers
dc:identifier.*- Identifier
- uk.bl.ethos.811453