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University of Sheffield

Familiar Paths: The Rationality of Habitual Action

Abstract

dc:description.abstract

What contribution do habits make to the explanations of what habit-bearers do when they act habitually? More specifically, do they make a rational contribution by shaping the landscape of the habit-bearer’s reasons? Many think the answer must be ‘no’, since habits are mere behavioral dispositions which manifest in automatic, mindless behavior. In this thesis, I argue that this is false. Habits make a rational contribution by figuring in what I call ‘broad rationalising explanations’ when they manifest. That is, they have some rational bearing on the reasons for which a habit-bearer acts when they act habitually. I call this ‘the Rationalising View’. Further, I argue that habits do this because they are tendencies to do things for the reason that doing this is familiar, where this reason is unavailable to people without the habit-bearer’s history of action. Therefore, I elucidate the rational role and metaphysical nature of habit by connecting it to the notion of familiarity, and showing the theoretical benefits of doing so. Chapter 1 argues against Gilbert Ryle’s view of habit as an internally simple disposition to do things mindlessly. In Chapter 2, I argue for a framework for thinking about rationalising explanations within which we can assess arguments for and against the Rationalising View, and I outline my argument for that thesis. Because the argument requires some claims about intention, in Chapter 3 I consider the connection between reasons and intention. I argue for the Rationalising View in Chapter 4, and defend it from objections in Chapter 5. In Chapter 6, I reject some models of the Rationalising View in favour of one which centres on familiarity. In Chapter 7, I argue that this model does explanatory work in the theory of habit, particularly in giving us an account of the force of habit.

Degree

thesis:*
Name dc:type.qualificationname
Ph.D
Level dc:type.qualificationlevel
doctoral
Grantor dc:publisher.institution
University of Sheffield
Year dc:date.issued
2021

Author and committee

dc:creator, dc:contributor.*
Author dc:creator
  • Hornett, William
Advisors dc:contributor.advisor
  • Romdenh-Romluc, Komarine
  • Steward, Helen
ORCID person:identifier.orcid

Rights

Language dc:language.dcterms_iso639_2
eng

Identifiers

dc:identifier.*
Identifier
uk.bl.ethos.852119
Dc Identifier Grantnumber
150143862

Chain of custody

source
Harvested from
White Rose University Consortium
Base URL
etheses.whiterose.ac.uk/cgi/oai2
Last updated
2026-11-18
Source record
OAI-PMH GetRecord
related terms
citation

Hornett, William. Familiar Paths: The Rationality of Habitual Action. doctoral thesis, University of Sheffield, 2021.