University of York
Moral responsibility for unforeseen harms caused by autonomous systems
Abstract
dc:description.abstractAutonomous systems are machines which embody Artificial Intelligence and Machine Learning and which take actions in the world, independently of direct human control. Their deployment raises a pressing question, which I call the 'locus of moral responsibility' question: who, if anyone, is morally responsible for a harm caused directly by an autonomous system? My specific focus is moral responsibility for unforeseen harms. First, I set up the 'locus of moral responsibility' problem. Unforeseen harms from autonomous systems create a problem for what I call the Standard View, rooted in common sense, that human agents are morally responsible. Unforeseen harms give credence to the main claim of ‘responsibility gap’ arguments – that humans do not meet the control and knowledge conditions of responsibility sufficiently to warrant such an ascription. Second, I argue a delegation framework offers a powerful route for answering the 'locus of moral responsibility' question. I argue that responsibility as attributability traces to the human principals who made the decision to delegate to the system, notwithstanding a later suspension of control and knowledge. These principals would also be blameworthy if their decision to delegate did not serve a purpose that morally justified the subsequent risk- imposition in the first place. Because I argue that different human principals share moral responsibility, I defend a pluralist Standard View. Third, I argue that, while today’s autonomous systems do not meet the agential condition for moral responsibility, it is neither conceptually incoherent nor physically impossible that they might. Because I take it to be a contingent and not a necessary truth that human principals exclusively bear moral responsibility, I defend a soft, pluralist Standard View. Finally, I develop and sharpen my account in response to possible objections, and I explore its wider implications.
Degree
thesis:*- Name dc:type.qualificationname
- Ph.D
- Level dc:type.qualificationlevel
- doctoral
- Grantor dc:publisher.institution
- University of York
- Year dc:date.issued
- 2021
Author and committee
dc:creator, dc:contributor.*- Author dc:creator
-
- Porter, Zoe
- Advisors dc:contributor.advisor
-
- Stephen, Holland
- Paul, Noordhof
- ORCID person:identifier.orcid
Rights
- Language dc:language.dcterms_iso639_2
- eng
Identifiers
dc:identifier.*- Identifier
- uk.bl.ethos.850002