University of York
Justice, Agency, and The Good: A Sartrean Approach to the Rawlsian Problem of Stability
Abstract
dc:description.abstractIn this thesis, I adopt a Sartrean perspective to criticise and reformulate Rawls’s response to the problem of stability. For Rawls, a conception of justice must be stable; that is, persons should be able to abide by the just organisation of social institutions. To achieve this aim within his framework, Rawls claims that persons can include justice within their conception of the good, defined in terms of a rational plan of life. In particular, Rawls argues that affirming justice within one’s life plan expresses one’s status as a unified self, secures the conditions for purposive agency, and enables the pursuit of one’s major desires and interests. The culmination of these claims is the congruence argument: the Rawlsian conception of justice achieves stability because the shared sense of justice and the individual pursuit of a good life are congruent. I criticise Rawls on three points. First, I contend that Rawls’s position on rationality conflicts with his account of the unity of the self. Second, I demonstrate that Rawls commits to rationalistic voluntarism through his notion of life-planning. In contrast, I propound a Sartrean account of a non-localised, practical form of agency. Third, I argue that Rawls mischaracterises goodness; specifically, I show that a person’s good cannot consist in their life plan since the process of life-planning is an extension of what the agent already takes to be good. Subsequently, I provide an alternative version of the congruence argument divided between, (i), a reflective endorsement of the Rawlsian society correlative to a particular self conception and, (ii), the inclusion of justice within a fundamental project as a way of integrating and structuring one’s other projects. In doing so, I offer a novel approach to exploring the issue of congruence via Sartre’s existential phenomenology.
Degree
thesis:*- Name dc:type.qualificationname
- Ph.D
- Level dc:type.qualificationlevel
- doctoral
- Grantor dc:publisher.institution
- University of York
- Year dc:date.issued
- 2024
Author and committee
dc:creator, dc:contributor.*- Author dc:creator
-
- Pawlett-Howell, Robin
- Advisors dc:contributor.advisor
-
- O'Neill, Martin
- Ratcliffe, Matthew
Rights
- Language dc:language.dcterms_iso639_2
- eng