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University of York

Justice, Agency, and The Good: A Sartrean Approach to the Rawlsian Problem of Stability

Abstract

dc:description.abstract

In this thesis, I adopt a Sartrean perspective to criticise and reformulate Rawls’s response to the problem of stability. For Rawls, a conception of justice must be stable; that is, persons should be able to abide by the just organisation of social institutions. To achieve this aim within his framework, Rawls claims that persons can include justice within their conception of the good, defined in terms of a rational plan of life. In particular, Rawls argues that affirming justice within one’s life plan expresses one’s status as a unified self, secures the conditions for purposive agency, and enables the pursuit of one’s major desires and interests. The culmination of these claims is the congruence argument: the Rawlsian conception of justice achieves stability because the shared sense of justice and the individual pursuit of a good life are congruent. I criticise Rawls on three points. First, I contend that Rawls’s position on rationality conflicts with his account of the unity of the self. Second, I demonstrate that Rawls commits to rationalistic voluntarism through his notion of life-planning. In contrast, I propound a Sartrean account of a non-localised, practical form of agency. Third, I argue that Rawls mischaracterises goodness; specifically, I show that a person’s good cannot consist in their life plan since the process of life-planning is an extension of what the agent already takes to be good. Subsequently, I provide an alternative version of the congruence argument divided between, (i), a reflective endorsement of the Rawlsian society correlative to a particular self conception and, (ii), the inclusion of justice within a fundamental project as a way of integrating and structuring one’s other projects. In doing so, I offer a novel approach to exploring the issue of congruence via Sartre’s existential phenomenology.

Degree

thesis:*
Name dc:type.qualificationname
Ph.D
Level dc:type.qualificationlevel
doctoral
Grantor dc:publisher.institution
University of York
Year dc:date.issued
2024

Author and committee

dc:creator, dc:contributor.*
Author dc:creator
  • Pawlett-Howell, Robin
Advisors dc:contributor.advisor
  • O'Neill, Martin
  • Ratcliffe, Matthew

Rights

Language dc:language.dcterms_iso639_2
eng

Chain of custody

source
Harvested from
White Rose University Consortium
Base URL
etheses.whiterose.ac.uk/cgi/oai2
Last updated
2026-11-18
Source record
OAI-PMH GetRecord
related terms
citation

Pawlett-Howell, Robin. Justice, Agency, and The Good: A Sartrean Approach to the Rawlsian Problem of Stability. doctoral thesis, University of York, 2024.