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University of Leeds

Opportunism and Insider Trading during the Trade War

Abstract

dc:description.abstract

This thesis examines opportunism of insider trading during the trade war in 2018. The objectives of this thesis are: first, to investigate whether political connections can facilitate insiders to behave opportunistically; second, to examine whether opportunistic or routine insiders to be involved in informed trading; third, to observe whether social connections can facilitate opportunistic sellers to be involved in informed trading. The first empirical chapter analyses the short-term profit making behaviour of politically connected insiders at all US companies during the trade war in 2018. The baseline results refer to the positive relation between political connections and informed trading during the trade war. These relations are stronger among insiders with recent direct political links than stale ones. Additionally, event studies and difference-in-differences results indicate that the politically connected insiders generated higher abnormal returns at event windows surrounding the announcement date of the trade war. All results suggest that politically connected insiders can have a significant information advantage during the trade war and that connections can facilitate them to behave opportunistically. The second empirical chapter examines whether opportunistic insiders earn higher short-term returns compared to routine insiders in US during the trade war in 2018. Importantly, our findings provide evidence that opportunistic insiders receive higher returns compared to routine insiders during the trade war. This evidence is also pronounced when opportunistic insiders are politically connected. Furthermore, we interestingly find that opportunistic CEOs and female insiders receive higher returns compared to routine CEOs and female insiders. Our results are robust to various model specifications, alternative measures, and endogeneity concerns. Overall, our findings suggest that opportunistic insiders can have a significant information advantage and that information can facilitate them to be involved in informed trading during the trade war. The final empirical chapter analyses the opportunistic selling by socially connected insiders at all US firms during the trade war in 2018. We find evidence that socially connected opportunistic sellers receive higher returns than socially connected routine sellers. This evidence is more pronounced when opportunistic sellers are more socially connected and belong to firms which have business connections with China. Furthermore, we find supportive evidence that socially connected opportunistic sellers receive more returns than politically connected opportunistic sellers during the trade war. Our findings survive various alternative, robustness and endogeneity tests. Overall, our findings suggest that social connections can facilitate opportunistic sellers to be involved in informed trading.

Degree

thesis:*
Name dc:type.qualificationname
Ph.D
Level dc:type.qualificationlevel
doctoral
Grantor dc:publisher.institution
University of Leeds
Year dc:date.issued
2024

Author and committee

dc:creator, dc:contributor.*
Author dc:creator
  • Das, Bijoy Chandra
Advisors dc:contributor.advisor
  • Uddin, Moshfique
  • Amini, Shima
ORCID person:identifier.orcid

Rights

Language dc:language.dcterms_iso639_2
eng

Chain of custody

source
Harvested from
White Rose University Consortium
Base URL
etheses.whiterose.ac.uk/cgi/oai2
Last updated
2026-11-18
Source record
OAI-PMH GetRecord
related terms
citation

Das, Bijoy Chandra. Opportunism and Insider Trading during the Trade War. doctoral thesis, University of Leeds, 2024.