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University of York

Essays on The Economics of Platform Competition

Abstract

dc:description.abstract

This thesis consists of three essays on the economics of platform competition. Theoretical approaches are undertaken to analyse the functioning of a two-sided market from different perspectives. The first chapter studies the impacts of a bandwagon, snob or congestion effects and sellers’ competition in the presence of multihoming. Results demonstrate that all market participants, including buyers, sellers, and platforms, exhibit a preference for multihoming over singlehoming scenarios, irrespective of whether only one side or both sides of the market are multihoming. Whilst multihoming equilibrium fees are comparatively higher, the resulting aggregate surpluses on both market sides are also higher. Furthermore, the increased number of participants in the market provides platforms with additional fees, further boosting their profits. The second chapter presents a novel framework for studying platform competition by examining the mechanisms through which asymmetric platforms attract agents, particularly how they appeal to buyers. To capture the strategic interactions between platforms, a two-stage game is considered in which heterogeneous platforms simultaneously choose features on buyers' side in the first stage and membership fees in the second stage. Results show that buyers’ decisions to join a platform are influenced not only by membership fees and cross-network effects but also by the range of functionalities offered by the platform. The third chapter develops a two-period dynamic model of platform competition, in which buyers have imperfect information concerning the quality of the platforms. Consequently, buyers must first experience platforms’ features before deciding to switch to a different intermediary. A general insight is developed into the strategies employed by platforms in setting their membership fees and the implications this has on determining market shares, considering the presence of cross-group network effects and quality uncertainty on buyers’ side. This framework allows endogenisation of buyers' switching decisions and asymmetric platforms in equilibrium.

Degree

thesis:*
Name dc:type.qualificationname
Ph.D
Level dc:type.qualificationlevel
doctoral
Grantor dc:publisher.institution
University of York
Year dc:date.issued
2023

Author and committee

dc:creator, dc:contributor.*
Author dc:creator
  • Cavazos Flores, Roberto
Advisor dc:contributor.advisor
  • Bipasa, Datta

Rights

Language dc:language.dcterms_iso639_2
eng

Identifiers

dc:identifier.*
Dc Identifier Grantnumber
2018-000061-02EXTF-00065

Chain of custody

source
Harvested from
White Rose University Consortium
Base URL
etheses.whiterose.ac.uk/cgi/oai2
Last updated
2026-11-18
Source record
OAI-PMH GetRecord
related terms
citation

Cavazos Flores, Roberto. Essays on The Economics of Platform Competition. doctoral thesis, University of York, 2023.