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University of Sheffield

Formalizing, Analyzing and Improving Aerospace Security Protocols

Abstract

dc:description.abstract

Secure networking protocols for domains such as the internet and the internet-of-things are regularly scrutinized and discussed by the research community. This status quo can be attributed to their pervasiveness in the modern technological landscape and the heavy dependence on the security of these protocols to reliably fulfill myriad everyday tasks. In contrast, the security of aerospace protocols has not received a proportionate level of investigation despite the fact that an attack on these protocols may result in catastrophic consequences. The reason for this can be twofold; the digitization of avionic communication is an experimental and ongoing process with legacy analogue components still in use; and most non-terrestrial communication protocols are closed-source which limits their public scrutiny. This work endeavors to address this gap in three parallels; we propose a formalism that captures the security of the integral handover phase of aviation communication; we analyze the security of non-terrestrial protocol Bundle Protocol Security (BPSec) and propose security improvements; finally, we propose quantum-secure protocol constructions for aviation communication, supported by empirical results of their performance on resource-constrained devices. We begin by introducing a universal formalized framework that captures handover schemes as a unique primitive. Moreover, we construct security experiments that cap- ture distinct security properties for handovers, and propose a generic protocol construction that captures all identified security properties. We then shift our focus to the analysis of the non-terrestrial BPSec protocol, which we analyze as a flexible secure channel and propose a stronger construction with additional integrity guarantees. Finally, we return to the aviation domain and propose quantum-secure protocol constructions for air-to-ground communication as well as handovers. We implement our secure avionic constructions and evaluate their performance on resource-constrained devices to account for resource limitations of on-board avionic components. We design our avionic handover construction integrating our formalism for handovers, focusing on reducing the computational overhead of complex cryptographic operations. We formally prove the cryptographic security of our avionic protocol constructions within appropriate models capable of capturing their post- quantum security.

Degree

thesis:*
Name dc:type.qualificationname
Ph.D
Level dc:type.qualificationlevel
doctoral
Grantor dc:publisher.institution
University of Sheffield
Year dc:date.issued
2025

Author and committee

dc:creator, dc:contributor.*
Author dc:creator
  • Wimalasiri, Bhagya
Advisors dc:contributor.advisor
  • Dowling, Benjamin
  • Clark, John
ORCID person:identifier.orcid

Rights

Language dc:language.dcterms_iso639_2
eng

Chain of custody

source
Harvested from
White Rose University Consortium
Base URL
etheses.whiterose.ac.uk/cgi/oai2
Last updated
2026-11-18
Source record
OAI-PMH GetRecord
related terms
citation

Wimalasiri, Bhagya. Formalizing, Analyzing and Improving Aerospace Security Protocols. doctoral thesis, University of Sheffield, 2025.