Back to search

University of Leeds

Normative Disagreement for Expressivists

Abstract

dc:description.abstract

The present thesis argues that expressivists can account for normative disagreement in terms of the inability for normative judgements to jointly bring about mental states in a particular agent. I explore existing expressivist-friendly accounts of normative disagreement and disagreement-in-general, and generate success criteria based on their respective successes and failures. I then argue for a particular theory of normative disagreement, demonstrating that it meets these criteria, and succeeds against a number of possible objections that may be raised against it.

Degree

thesis:*
Name dc:type.qualificationname
MA by research
Level dc:type.qualificationlevel
masters
Grantor dc:publisher.institution
University of Leeds
Year dc:date.issued
2025

Author and committee

dc:creator, dc:contributor.*
Author dc:creator
  • Bernard, Louis
Advisors dc:contributor.advisor
  • Gamester, William
  • Woods, Jack

Rights

Language dc:language.dcterms_iso639_2
eng

Chain of custody

source
Harvested from
White Rose University Consortium
Base URL
etheses.whiterose.ac.uk/cgi/oai2
Last updated
2026-11-18
Source record
OAI-PMH GetRecord
related terms
citation

Bernard, Louis. Normative Disagreement for Expressivists. masters thesis, University of Leeds, 2025.