Abstract
dc:description.abstractThe present thesis argues that expressivists can account for normative disagreement in terms of the inability for normative judgements to jointly bring about mental states in a particular agent. I explore existing expressivist-friendly accounts of normative disagreement and disagreement-in-general, and generate success criteria based on their respective successes and failures. I then argue for a particular theory of normative disagreement, demonstrating that it meets these criteria, and succeeds against a number of possible objections that may be raised against it.
Degree
thesis:*- Name dc:type.qualificationname
- MA by research
- Level dc:type.qualificationlevel
- masters
- Grantor dc:publisher.institution
- University of Leeds
- Year dc:date.issued
- 2025
Author and committee
dc:creator, dc:contributor.*- Author dc:creator
-
- Bernard, Louis
- Advisors dc:contributor.advisor
-
- Gamester, William
- Woods, Jack
Rights
- Language dc:language.dcterms_iso639_2
- eng