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University of Leeds

Doxastic resilience: on rational doubt, defeat, decision, and desire

Abstract

dc:description.abstract

Beliefs can be more or less supported by evidence. When the evidence speaks in favour of some proposition p, you can rationally be confident that p. On the Bayesian interpretation of doxastic states, this amounts to a high credence in p. But this cannot be the full account of confidence. Gaining evidence that supports the credence you already have improves your epistemic situation. Here, your credence level should remain unchanged, but the credence should become more resistant to change. Doxastic resilience measures your disposition to change credence in the face of incoming evidence. The central claim of this thesis is that by thinking of confidence in terms of both the level and resilience of credences, we can make progress on several philosophical problems. After briefly introducing doxastic resilience in Chapter 1, I put the concept to use in four philosophical debates. Chapter 2 offers an evidential account of rational resistance to counterevidence which contrasts with views according to which knowledge plays a special role in safeguarding against counterevidence. Chapter 3 argues that loss of resilience can influence rational decision-making, which sheds light on the normative significance of certain kinds of higher-order defeat. This contrasts with imprecise probability views on which higher-order defeat increases the imprecision of credence. Chapter 4 argues that higher-order uncertainty calibrates first-order credences and constrains expected resilience. This explains both higher-order confirmation and defeat. Chapter 5 shows that resilience bears on the expected value of inquiry. When unresilient, one should expect new evidence to be valuable. This explains cases where seemingly identical decision-relevant credences and utilities should nevertheless make different decisions when inquiry is feasible.

Degree

thesis:*
Name dc:type.qualificationname
Ph.D
Level dc:type.qualificationlevel
doctoral
Grantor dc:publisher.institution
University of Leeds
Year dc:date.issued
2026

Author and committee

dc:creator, dc:contributor.*
Author dc:creator
  • Donskov, Jakob Grinderslev
Advisors dc:contributor.advisor
  • Bradley, Darren
  • Saatsi, Juha
ORCID person:identifier.orcid

Rights

Language dc:language.dcterms_iso639_2
eng

Identifiers

dc:identifier.*
Dc Identifier Grantnumber
AH/R012733/1

Chain of custody

source
Harvested from
White Rose University Consortium
Base URL
etheses.whiterose.ac.uk/cgi/oai2
Last updated
2026-11-18
Source record
OAI-PMH GetRecord
related terms
citation

Donskov, Jakob Grinderslev. Doxastic resilience: on rational doubt, defeat, decision, and desire. doctoral thesis, University of Leeds, 2026.