Abstract
dc:description.abstractIn this thesis, I intend to argue against Tallant’s (2014) argument against mereological nihilism. In Chapter 1, I detail the landscape of mereological nihilisms, highlighting difference between them. In Chapter 2, I present Tallant’s argument against mereological nihilism – the Argument from the SAQ. I introduce the Argument from GLOBALISATION in support of one of the premises in the Argument from the SAQ and replace the principle of GLOBALISATION with the stronger principle of GLOBALISATION*. In Chapter 3, I prevent a potential criticism against Tallant. Namely, I argue that he can maintain GLOBALISATION and that facts of composition are contingent. In Chapter 4, I show how adopting Williamson’s necessitist ontology would help the nihilist answer Tallant’s argument. In Chapter 5, I argue against GLOBALISATION*, showing that it has untenable consequences for its proponent. In Chapter 6, I tie up two loose ends. Firstly, I consider the demonstrative answer to the SAQ. Secondly, I consider what semantic theory nihilists should adopt.
Degree
thesis:*- Name dc:type.qualificationname
- M.Phil
- Level dc:type.qualificationlevel
- masters
- Grantor dc:publisher.institution
- University of York
- Year dc:date.issued
- 2026
Author and committee
dc:creator, dc:contributor.*- Author dc:creator
-
- Obber, Allyson
- Advisors dc:contributor.advisor
-
- Ingram, David
- Leng, Mary
- ORCID person:identifier.orcid
Rights
- Language dc:language.dcterms_iso639_2
- eng