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University of York

Mereological nihilism and the Special Arrangement Question

Abstract

dc:description.abstract

In this thesis, I intend to argue against Tallant’s (2014) argument against mereological nihilism. In Chapter 1, I detail the landscape of mereological nihilisms, highlighting difference between them. In Chapter 2, I present Tallant’s argument against mereological nihilism – the Argument from the SAQ. I introduce the Argument from GLOBALISATION in support of one of the premises in the Argument from the SAQ and replace the principle of GLOBALISATION with the stronger principle of GLOBALISATION*. In Chapter 3, I prevent a potential criticism against Tallant. Namely, I argue that he can maintain GLOBALISATION and that facts of composition are contingent. In Chapter 4, I show how adopting Williamson’s necessitist ontology would help the nihilist answer Tallant’s argument. In Chapter 5, I argue against GLOBALISATION*, showing that it has untenable consequences for its proponent. In Chapter 6, I tie up two loose ends. Firstly, I consider the demonstrative answer to the SAQ. Secondly, I consider what semantic theory nihilists should adopt.

Degree

thesis:*
Name dc:type.qualificationname
M.Phil
Level dc:type.qualificationlevel
masters
Grantor dc:publisher.institution
University of York
Year dc:date.issued
2026

Author and committee

dc:creator, dc:contributor.*
Author dc:creator
  • Obber, Allyson
Advisors dc:contributor.advisor
  • Ingram, David
  • Leng, Mary
ORCID person:identifier.orcid

Rights

Language dc:language.dcterms_iso639_2
eng

Chain of custody

source
Harvested from
White Rose University Consortium
Base URL
etheses.whiterose.ac.uk/cgi/oai2
Last updated
2026-11-18
Source record
OAI-PMH GetRecord
related terms
citation

Obber, Allyson. Mereological nihilism and the Special Arrangement Question. masters thesis, University of York, 2026.