Abstract
dc:description.abstractThis project examines whether we can consistently make two claims: i) God cannot prevent sin without destroying free will; and ii) in heaven, God prevents sin without destroying free will. It explores the conditions under which agents may be said to be acting freely, guided by consideration of the free will defence to the problem of evil. This involves considering prominent themes in the philosophy of action, and in the metaphysics of free will. It develops, and defends, a non-causal incompatibilist account of free agency. This is then applied to the theological problem of how God ensures the sinlessness of the saints in heaven, and why this could not be achieved prior to heaven.
Degree
thesis:*- Name dc:type.qualificationname
- Ph.D
- Level dc:type.qualificationlevel
- doctoral
- Grantor dc:publisher.institution
- University of York
- Year dc:date.issued
- 2014
Author and committee
dc:creator, dc:contributor.*- Author dc:creator
-
- Tamburro, Richard Anthony Stuart
- Advisor dc:contributor.advisor
-
- Efird, David
Rights
- Language dc:language.dcterms_iso639_2
- eng
Identifiers
dc:identifier.*- Identifier
- uk.bl.ethos.617223