Abstract
dc:description.abstractThis dissertation considers a theory of numerical identity, first presented by P.T. Geach (1962). I label this theory `the strong theory of relative identity'. I suggest that the strong theory of relative identity involves three theses, which I name `GT', `RI', and `SRI'. I argue that each of these theses is logically independent. I consider arguments for and against each of these theses in turn. I conclude that none of the arguments for GT, RI, or SRI are conclusive. However, I also argue that the arguments against GT, RI and SRI are unsuccessful. I argue, further, that the strong theory of relative identity, and GT in particular, is incompatible with classical semantics and classical first-order logic with identity. I consider alternative non-classical logical systems and semantics which might be compatible with the strong theory of relative identity. Finally, I consider the philosophical applications of the strong theory of relative identity. I focus on one area, specifically philosophical theology, and I argue, with respect to the logical problem of the Trinity, that either GT is true or orthodoxy is false.
Degree
thesis:*- Name dc:type.qualificationname
- Ph.D
- Level dc:type.qualificationlevel
- doctoral
- Grantor dc:publisher.institution
- University of York
- Year dc:date.issued
- 2014
Author and committee
dc:creator, dc:contributor.*- Author dc:creator
-
- Molto, Daniel V
- Advisor dc:contributor.advisor
-
- Efird, David
Rights
- Language dc:language.dcterms_iso639_2
- eng
Identifiers
dc:identifier.*- Identifier
- uk.bl.ethos.647061