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I investigate whether the determinants of Private Savings changed for G7 countries during the Great Recession. I do this by controlling for many of the key determinants of private savings from previous literature and then adding control variables for each country and adding a post-recession variable (2009-2015). In my third and final regression, after controlling for both countries and country multiplied by time, I found evidence that the private savings rates dropped after the Great Recession.

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Cette thèse transdisciplinaire en économie et science politique étudie les divers aspects de la doctrine de la gouvernance dans les agendas des institutions et organisations internationales (OIs) en adoptant les outils de l’Economie Politique Internationale. La première partie mobilise deux chapitres pour analyser la doctrine de la gouvernance dans sa genèse, conceptualisation, diffusion et appropriation dans la communauté du développement international. Le chapitre 1 montre que les approches contemporaines de la gouvernance rompent avec les approches traditionnelles sur la légitimité politique et l’efficience économique en prenant en compte l’hybridité, l’hétérogénéité et la multiplicité des acteurs et des centres de décisions. Le chapitre 2 apporte sa contribution au débat sur la diffusion des idées et normes dans la sphère des politiques de développement en prenant l’exemple de la Banque Mondiale à travers son agenda sur les normes de gouvernance. Ce chapitre montre que la Banque Mondiale a eu différents comportements vis-À-Vis de la doctrine de la gouvernance, en évoluant d’une approche économique vers une approche sociopolitique dans une optique néolibérale.Ce chapitre montre que la combinaison du pouvoir d’influence et d’injonction de la Banque Mondiale lui a permis d’utiliser ses indicateurs de gouvernance comme un moyen d’influence de sa politique d ’aide au développement de même que celles des autres principaux donneurs. A travers deux chapitres, la seconde partie effectue une investigation dans les dimensions sociales et environnementales de la gouvernance dans une perspective de développement durable dans les pays en développement. Ainsi, le chapitre 3 examine les politiques de gouvernance sociale des OIs et vise à saisir les effets de l’aide multilatérale sur les inégalités de revenu et la protection sociale dans les pays en développement. Il montre que cette aide a des effets bénéfiques uniquement dans les pays ayant une bonne qualité institutionnelle. Enfin le chapitre 4 propose un modèle de principal-Agent illustrant des interactions d’économie politique entre l’offre et la demande de bonne gouvernance dans le cas du civisme environnemental, de la corruption et de la déforestation dans les pays en développement. Il trouve que l’aide multilatérale destinée au secteur forestier est plus efficace dans la réduction de la déforestation dans les pays ayant à la fois un meilleur civisme environnemental et un état de droit. / This interdisciplinary thesis in economics and political science analyzes the multidimensional aspects of the governance doctrine in the agendas of multilateral and International Organizations (IOs) by adopting the framework of International Political Economy (IPE). The first part uses two chapters to analyze the doctrine of governance in its genesis, conceptualization, diffusion and appropriation in the international development community. Chapter 1 found that current approaches of governance break with traditional approaches of political legitimacy and economic efficiency by taking into account the hybridity, heterogeneity and multiplicity of stakeholders in decision-Making. Chapter 2 brings its contribution to the debate on ideas and norms diffusion in development policies scene by taking the example of the world Bank and its agenda on governance norms. We show that the World Bank has developed different behaviors vis- à-Vis the governance doctrine, moving from economic to political and social approaches through a neoliberal framework. The World Bank’s smart power, based on its governance indicators, has been found to exert some notable influences on its foreign development assistance policies as well as those of the other key aid actors. Through two chapters, the second part investigates about social and environmental dimensions of governance in a perspective of sustainable development in developing countries. Chapter 3 studies the behaviors of IOs in terms ofsocial governance. Its empirical investigations, on the effects of multilateral aid on income inequalities and social protection in developing countries, show that aid has beneficial effects only in recipient countries presenting good governance policies. Ultimately, chapter 4 proposes a principal-Agent model highlighting some political economy interactions between supply and demand sides for good governance in the case of environmental compliance, corruption and deforestation in developing countries. This chapter shows empirically that multilateral aid, to the forestry sector, is more effective in reducing deforestation in countries presenting both a better environmental compliance and rule of law.

This dissertation studies three important questions in international political economy: The long run consequences of social divisions created by historical colonialism, the importance of trade shocks in shifting political power balances and shaping institutional development and the influence that major political powers have over the decisions of smaller nations. I study these three questions empirically in four papers that span three distinct regions and time periods. The first paper asks whether the large differences in economic development across Native American reservations today can be explained by social divisions that were created more than 150 years ago when the US government forcibly integrated distinct Native American bands into shared reservations, condemning them to a system of shared governance that was not consistent with their political traditions and tribal identities. The second and third papers study the effect of the first globalization on the political and economic equilibrium in seventeen 19th century British Caribbean plantation colonies. I use this set of highly comparable but in precise ways distinct islands as a laboratory to study the effect of globalization on the long run development of representative institutions and on the coerciveness of labour markets at the time. The first of two papers provides insights into the working of colonial institutions and traces the mechanisms through which the planter elite managed to maintain a monopoly over policy making and retard long run development. The second paper highlights the importance that exogenous output price changes had for the willingness of planter elites to engage in costly coercion that distorted labour markets in their favour. In the final paper I test whether major aid donors use foreign aid to buy the votes of developing countries. Taking advantage of a unique long-running dispute between major donors in the International Whaling Commission, I am able to address the three major empirical challenges in answering this question: that aid moves much slower than voting behaviour, that alliances constantly change with issues and that most international organizations vote frequently and on a range of issues while data on aid disbursals is available only in yearly aggregates.