Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of Texas at Austin, 2005. / Vita. Includes bibliographical references.

Thesis (M.A.)--Trinity College, Hartford, Conn., 2007. / Title from PDF cover (viewed Aug. 27, 2007). Includes bibliographical references (leaves 75-78).

Thesis (M. Arch.)(Prof)--University of Pretoria, 2006. / Includes bibliographical references. Available on the Internet via the World Wide Web.

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The aim of this dissertation is to increase knowledge of political efficacy,both theoretically and empirically. A thorough theoretical discussion iscombined with empirical studies of the development of political efficacy and of its effects on political participation. The results are also discussed in the light of political equality. In three papers, quantitative data on Swedish adolescents are analyzed. The first paper discusses what political efficacy actually entails. Based on an overview of previous research, a merged multidisciplinary perspective with a focus on people’s beliefs in their capacities to perform political actions is presented. Four main pathways concerning how youths gain political efficacy are tested. The second paper’s main question is whether, and in which ways, schools can help students gain political efficacy. In the light of political equality, it reflects upon the individual and societal effects of potential gains in youths’ political efficacy. The third paper scrutinizes the effects of political efficacy on political participation. In addition, the combinations of having political efficacy beliefs, and political knowledge or interest, are tested in order to explore potential interaction (leverage) effects. Altogether, this dissertation presents a more refined and stringent view on political efficacy. It further clarifies the concept itself, which may aid clearer, more coherent, and less ambiguous research. It also provides an input into an existing framework for understanding the development of youths’ political efficacy. Finally, it finds that political efficacy seems to work as a lever for participation. Combined with political interest, it facilitatesthe transformation of psychological engagement into political action. The findings will inform discussion on the implications of stimulating youths’ political efficacy to promote political participation and political equality. By boosting political efficacy along various pathways – in part independently of socioeconomic status – political equality may be promoted by benefiting the least advantaged.

This study examines how people construct and negotiate social identity in neighborhood associations. It builds on previous social identity research by examining how identity construction is important in regards to political behavior, but in an unexamined context - that of neighborhood associations. Neighborhood associations are groups that are formally organized and frequently interact with city employees and elected officials to obtain and/or improve city services in that geographic location. This study is informed by interpretive approaches to social science inquiry. My findings are based on three sources: participant observations of neighborhood association meetings in the City of St. Louis, Missouri during 2008-2009; 31 semi-structured interviews with neighborhood association leaders, members, and city employees during the spring and summer of 2009; and document analysis of association materials such as meeting agendas and by-laws. Neighborhood associations can be both a source of empowerment and exclusion. Needless to say, people negotiate multiple social identities based on race, gender, and class. In general, gendered identities were activated far less than racial or nationalistic identities, and when they were activated, it was in the context of a private interview not a public meeting. In the best situations, people were able to form new collective identities and bridge differences across diverse backgrounds

This thesis seeks to add to the existing knowledge about the effects of the political sophistication of citizens on selective exposure in terms of the preference for like-minded media over attitudinal incongruent media. The traditional selective exposure majorly account for this phenomenon from a motivational perspective. Differing from previous studies, this thesis employs a cognitive approach to examine the level of political sophistication and selective exposure based on dual-process framework which grows out of heuristic and cognitive bias literature. This thesis first explicates the concept of political sophistication by proposing three dimensions, namely factual political knowledge, conceptual political knowledge, and the conceptual complexity of political thinking to indicate the construct of political sophistication. The cognitive nature of the three dimensions as well as their relationships with the extent of selective exposure, which is perceived as a form of confirmation bias, are discussed based on a tripartite model of dual-process theory. Two mediators, namely attitude extremity and perspective taking ability, are proposed and examined to see whether either or both of them play a role to mediate the influence of each dimension of political sophistication on the extent of selective exposure. The underlying mechanisms for the hypothesized model are expounded. The results suggest that the effect of the three dimensions on the extent of selective exposure are fully mediated by the two mediators, respectively. Different dimensions of political sophistication have different effects on attitude extremity and perspective taking ability, and these effects play a key role in the selection of like-minded media outlets. Both the conceptual complexity of political thinking and conceptual knowledge are positively correlated with the perspective taking ability; the same is not true for factual political knowledge. Moreover, both factual political knowledge and conceptual political knowledge are positively correlated with attitude extremity, while no significant correlation is observed between conceptual complexity and attitude extremity in the study sample. The effects of factual political knowledge and conceptual political knowledge on the extent of selective exposure are mediated by attitude extremity. The mediation effect of perspective taking ability on the relationship between conceptual complexity of political thinking and selective exposure, which can lessen the extent of selective exposure, is observed to be significant but weak when attitude extremity is included in the model. The implications of the different roles played by the three dimensions in the cognitive process, as well as contributions, practical significance and limitations are discussed on the basis of the abovementioned findings in conclusion part.

Over the last four decades, many developing countries transitioned to democracy with populations aspiring to break from authoritarian tradition for more representative government. While this wave of democratization was encouraging initially, observers came to realize that the break from tradition was anything but complete. The traditional clientelistic relations that pervaded political systems during authoritarian periods have been eroded by democratization in some countries, while in other countries, clientelism is thriving and continuing to impact political participation, primarily through vote-buying between patrons and clients. Therefore, the extent to which democratization erodes clientelism as widely expected, could not be assumed. The questions of what are the causal effects of clientelism on political participation, how does the vote-buying process unfold, how effective are the efforts to combat vote-buying, and what is the debate over the ethics of vote-buying motivate this dissertation; I draw on the experiences of Thai provinces to answer them. The objective of this dissertation is to examine the impact of clientelism, measured by vote-buying, on political participation using a multi-method approach. Using new primary and secondary data sources, I make several important original contributions with this study. First, I answer the question regarding the causal effects of clientelism on political participation by testing the resource theory and the theory of clientelism. I find that the poor, who are most likely to be enmeshed in clientelistic networks, voted just as often as the rich in two of the three general elections and both the national and local level elections. People in the countryside, the poor, vote more than their urban counterparts in both the national and local level elections. The poor also participate in the other forms of politics just as much as the rich. I find those with less education vote just as much as those with more education in all three general elections and the national level election, however, those with higher education voted more in the local level election. Those with higher education also boycott, demonstrate, and sign petitions more than those with lower education. I find that clientelism is the reason lower socioeconomic status rural individuals participate in politics as without clientelism, they would not be expected to participate as much as their richer and more educated urban counterparts. Second, I answer the question regarding how the vote-buying process unfolds by exploring original primary interview data collected by the author of elite and mass views of vote-buyers, sellers, intermediaries, and the vote-buying process. I find that all the actors involved have their own reasons and motivations for participating in the vote-buying process: vote-sellers are predominantly poor and poverty drives their need for the compensation provided through vote-buying, while vote-buyers and their intermediaries are very much aware of the needs of potential vote-sellers and they intentionally exploit these needs. Even though the poor are driven to become vote-sellers, we cannot readily assume that vote-buying is successful for vote-buyers, or in other words, we cannot assume that vote-buying results in votes for the vote-buyer. Prior to my study, scholars have made such an assumption, whether directly stated or inferred, which may lead to erroneous conclusions about the effectiveness of vote-buying resulting in votes for the vote-buyer. To overcome this, I developed a model of the vote-buying process where vote-buying is divided into specific steps: the offer to buy votes, the acceptance of the offer, the compensation, the showing up at the polls, and the casting of a vote for the vote-buyer. By employing my model of the vote-buying process, we see that sometimes voters act in a manner that is consistent with the vote-buyer's demands and others times they do not at virtually all the steps of the vote-buying process for very specific reasons, including poverty. Third, I answer the question regarding the effectiveness of efforts to combat vote-buying by exploring elite and mass views of the effectiveness of institutional constraints and civic education in combating vote-buying. My findings suggest that institutional constraints, namely the Election Commission, have some impact on reducing vote-buying, though the Election Commission is plagued with far-reaching limitations. I find attempts at civic education, however, are not really measurable. Even if these attempts at civic education were measurable, I do not believe there is any reason to suspect they would be effective considering they do not address the poverty issue. Finally, I answer the question regarding the debate over the ethics of vote-buying by exploring elite and mass views of the justifications for vote-buying. I then analyze the impact of vote-buying on the legitimacy of the Thai political system. I find that some Thais perceive vote-buying as unethical because it is illegal and dishonest, while others do not necessarily perceive vote-buying as unethical because of poverty and vote-buying norms Thais use to justify selling their votes. Moreover, I find that poverty and vote-buying norms impact the legitimacy of the Thai political system, especially for the rural poor, to the point where I argue that vote-buying does not necessarily negatively impact legitimacy of the Thai political system. Overall, this dissertation has answered the important questions about clientelism and the vote-buying measure. This study is important because clientelism is one of the most important informal institutional obstacles to free and fair elections and the findings in this study offer clarity of the impact of clientelism, and the vote-buying measure, on political participation in the Thai context.

This thesis has two parts, which together seek to explore the political channels of responsibility for global injustice. While there is much that we might owe each other as persons, the thesis argues that our political arrangements and interactions generate further duties for citizens, both as a collective and individually, and for states as political agents. Part I explores what states, as equal agents in the global sphere, owe to each other. It presents two sets of duties held by states: firstly, non-relational duties of non-harm, rescue, and the provision of basic human necessities; and secondly, a relational duty to respect the principle of equality in negotiation. Drawing from this foundation, Part II offers an account of citizen responsibility for states' failure to fulfil these duties. The thesis supports existing claims that citizens ought to bear the burdens of their participation in the state but makes a further claim that citizens of liberal western democracies can be held collectively morally responsible for the unjust acts of their state. This responsibility is grounded in citizens' endorsement of democracy, their influence and benefit from state action, and their unique position to hold the state accountable. As a result of this responsibility, the collective can be blamed, punished (within limits), expected to apologize, and held liable for remedial duties. In turn, citizens will have individual duties to 'do their bit' in fulfilling these collective remedial duties, as well as the collective duty of holding their state accountable. Each citizen's share of these collective duties will be determined by their capacity and effectiveness in contributing to the fulfilment of the duties, and their share of the influence over, and benefit from, the injustice.

In Malawi, as in many newly-democratic countries in the developing world, donor organisations and NGOs have embarked on projects aimed at making reforms in governance which have generated a profusion of new spaces for citizen engagement. This thesis critically examines one such project in Malawi against the backdrop of a democratic nation emerging from a background of dictatorial regime. For thirty years, until 1994, Malawi was under the one-party regime of Kamuzu Banda which was characterised by dictatorial tendencies, in which participatory processes were non-existent and development was defined in terms of client-patronage relationships between the state and society (Cammack, 2004: 17). In 1994, however, Malawi embraced a multiparty system of government, paving way to various political and social reforms, which adopted participatory approaches to development. Drawing on a number of literatures, this thesis seeks to historicize the relationship which developed during the pre democracy era between the state and society in Malawi to underscore its influence on the current dispositions displayed by both bureaucrats and citizens as they engage in participatory decision making processes. This is achieved through a critical realist case study of a participatory radio project in Malawi called Ndizathuzomwe which works through a network of community-based radio production structures popularly known as ‘Radio Listening Clubs’(RLCs) where communities are mobilised at village level to first identify and define development problems through consensus and then secondly engage state bureaucrats, politicians, and members of other relevant service delivery organisations in making decisions aimed at resolving community-identified development problems (Chijere-Chirwa et al, 2000). Unlike during the pre-democracy era, there is now a shift in the discourse of participation in development, from the participation of ‘beneficiaries’ in projects, to the more political and rights-based definitions of participation by citizens who are the ‘makers and shapers’ of their own development (Cornwall and Gaventa, 2000). The findings of this thesis, however point to the fact that, there remains a gap between normative expectations and empirical realities in that spaces for participation are not neutral, but are themselves shaped by power relations (Cornwall, 2002). A number of preconditions exist for entry into participatory institutions as such entry of certain interests and actors into public spaces is privileged over others through a prevailing mobilisation of bias or rules of the game (Lukes, 1974: I)