Thesis (Ph. D.)--Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Dept. of Political Science, 2011. / Cataloged from PDF version of thesis. / Includes bibliographical references (p. 353-375). / What explains variation in institution-building under foreign occupations? Why do some state-building missions produce effective and durable state institutions, while others leave a legacy of weak or dysfunctional ones? I explored these questions through a comparative study of the Japanese colonization of Taiwan (1895-1945) and the American colonization of the Philippines (1898-1941), which produced contrasting institutional legacies despite the presence of similar initial conditions. While a strong bureaucratic Taiwanese state arose in the aftermath of Japanese colonization, the legacy of the American occupation of the Philippines was a weak postcolonial state penetrated by parochial interests. I explain variation in institution-building outcomes through two causal variables: (i) the degree of discretionary power afforded to the occupational administration by the home government; and (ii) the ability of native elites to effectively resist the institution-building effort. Discretionary power allows reform agents to abandon any pre-formulated (and likely ill-conceived) plans, and instead flexibly integrate native laws, norms, and customs with their new institutional designs. Additionally, and contrary to conventional wisdom, more effective institutions emerge when native elites possess the willingness and capacity to resist (even violently) the institution-building effort of foreign agents. The reformist state-building agenda of occupiers is likely to be in direct opposition to the distributional interests of native elites, who seek to maintain their advantageous position within the existing order. It is, therefore, only under the threat of effective resistance that foreign agents will accommodate the interests of native elites to forge institutions with local ownership. The main empirical chapters of the dissertation draw on more than two years of original archival research in fourteen libraries and depositories across Japan, Taiwan, and the United States. In both cases, my analysis focused on the similarities and differences in the process through which education and police institutions were developed over time; these two areas were chosen due their importance for a country's political stability and socioeconomic development. The applicability of conclusions drawn from the historical cases to contemporary state-building missions was assessed through an examination of recent U.S. efforts at building a police institution in Afghanistan. / by Reo Matsuzaki. / Ph.D.

Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Dept. of Political Science. Thesis. 1967. Ph.D. / Bibliography: leaves 260-277. / Ph.D.

Thesis (Ph. D.)--Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Dept. of Political Science, 1996. / Includes bibliographical references (v. 2, p. 765-792). / by Kenneth M. Pollack. / Ph.D.

Thesis (Ph.D.)--Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Dept. of Political Science, 2000. / "June 2000." / Includes bibliographical references (p. 189-194). / What is economic democracy? What, if anything, justifies it? This thesis argues that liberal theories of justice are objectionable insofar as they emphasize the distribution of resources, having little to say about how production is governed. The commitments central to liberal democracy call for some degree of workplace democracy as well as distributive justice. Many liberals begin from a set of fundamental values, derive principles of distribution, and propose to organize economic institutions so as to realize these principles. I call this the 'Fabian logic of contemporary liberalism'. And I argue that it cannot be sustained. The values and ideas central to liberal democracy have implications for economic governance that are independent of distributive justice. They call for some degree of workplace democracy. The thesis defends this claim against three objections: that workplace democracy would be unnecessary in a just society; that there are non-employees -- e.g., community residents -- with a claim to govern the firm; and that workplace democracy is incompatible with liberal neutrality. The liberal conception of democracy underlying this argument has implications beyond the employment relationship. It suggests, most generally, that liberalism has a stronger connection to democratic institutions than its proponents, and many of its critics, have recognized. / by Ramón G. Vela. / Ph.D.

Thesis (Ph. D.)--Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Dept. of Political Science, 1996. / Includes bibliographical references (p. 325-343). / by Simona C. Piattoni. / Ph.D.

Thesis (Ph. D.)--Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Dept. of Political Science, 1992. / Includes bibliographical references (leaves 476-503). / by Ramesh Farzanfar. / Ph.D.

Thesis (Ph. D.)--Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Dept. of Political Science, 2010. / Cataloged from PDF version of thesis. / Includes bibliographical references (p. 280-291). / The number of exceptionally brutal ethnic confrontations that followed the end of the Cold War brought with them question of diaspora contributions to violence. The unwritten assumption was that diaspora compatriots were natural allies, sharing a strong sense of nationalism and standing at the ready to support their cousins abroad. Indeed, members of ethnic diasporas have shown a propensity to get involved in homeland wars. This study focuses on the extreme elements of these communities, tackling the question of why diaspora nationalists persist in advocating for maximalist solutions to home country conflicts when rationality suggests that they should do nothing or assume a compromise position. The dissertation argues that such hard line positions are the result of strong and enduring emotions. It lays out a model whereby emotions serve as the mechanism through which destructive nationalistic feelings come to dictate diaspora leaders' political positioning. This dynamic results in unyielding stances that are hostile and aggressive. Noteworthy about such reactions is that the primary operating emotion--humiliation--is, in fact, anchored in past episodes of trauma and dishonor that remain significant to certain members of the diaspora community. It endures in the everyday lives of diaspora individuals as a type of potential energy--simmering under the surface but not leading to any kind of extreme action. Only in the face of a specific triggering event does this emotion reactivate and become a vehicle for the expression of zealous ethno-nationalism. While the focus of this dissertation is fairly narrow--diaspora reaction to homeland violence--the work done on framing a theory of emotional causality can provide a launching point off of which a more general theory of emotions and radicalization can be built. While not directly stated, emotions are often assumed in most explanations of errant or radical behavior. Whether it be frustration, humiliation, anger, or alienation that drives people to action that harms themselves and others, it is obvious that a greater understanding of the causes will need to heavily rely on theories of emotions and how, and under what conditions, they lead to extreme behavior. / by Jessica M. Wattman. / Ph.D.

Thesis (Ph. D.)--Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Dept. of Political Science, 2009. / Cataloged from PDF version of thesis. / Includes bibliographical references (p. 226-244). / This study addresses the extent to which China's central state devolved ownership and investment levels in its energy sector to other actors during the modern reform period (1978- 2008). The project focused on China's coal and electric power industries, leveraging industry and government data, interviews, two firm case studies and a unique survey to measure policy, ownership and investment change over time. The results show that such devolution has been neither incrementally advancing nor consistently lacking, but has fluctuated according to the national electric power balance. The study suggests that China's central state actively manages the range of firms in the strategic coal and electric power industries as a dynamic portfolio of assets, resulting in such fluctuation. These findings run counter to what the dominant theories in the literature would otherwise predict. Neo-liberal theory would predict the incremental reduction of central state ownership in these sectors, as is evident in many of China's other sectors. Arguments predicated on the ability of the central state to sustain "self-reproducing authoritarianism" would predict fairly stable levels of central state investment and ownership in this strategic sector through time as well as quite limited liberalization. Finally, a theory privileging elite politics would indeed predict fluctuations, yet at different turning points in time than those found in this study, and without the sustained pattern that is evident in the extended time period under examination, which spans four distinct political eras. / (cont.) This first implication of this study is that neo-liberal means can be deployed to achieve state-led ends. Second, the study provides evidence that such means of economic liberalization reform need not be cumulative and are, in fact, reversible. Third, the case studies reveal that firm decisions have a significant impact on the execution of these powerful broad central state policy changes that periodically reshape the structure of China's energy sector. Finally, this study also raises important implications relating to public policy, and in particular the ability of the Chinese state to fulfill aggressive greenhouse gas emission reductions in an effort to mitigate climate change. / by Edward A. Cunningham, IV. / Ph.D.

Thesis (S.M.)--Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Dept. of Political Science, 2007. / Includes bibliographical references (leaves 115-121). / As China's participation in the global economy continues to expand, its increasing reliance on imported resources and overseas trade has exerted pressure on China to safeguard its growing maritime economic and political interests. Although Chinese national interests are well understood, there is no clear consensus regarding the long-term orientation or intended goals of China's modernizing military. By examining how sea power theory, maritime interests, economic and political constraints, and military/naval doctrine may influence China's naval force structure and maritime strategy, the author seeks to answer whether it is possible to deduce the most probable future roles of the People's Liberation Army Navy (PLAN). This paper suggest the answer is yes and identifies three force structure and maritime strategy models that the PLAN may utilize to support China's expanding global and maritime interests. The author posits that the PLAN will continue to make quantitative and qualitative improvements, but due primarily to fiscal and technological constraints, China will not directly challenge the United States by matching its extensive multiple mission naval force structure. The PLAN is still in a nascent stage of development and already has many of the pieces in place to proceed toward each model presented, but China must make choices that require it to develop the PLAN in conjunction with specific and elaborated maritime strategies or risk being a "jack-of-all-trades and a master of none." The PLAN will therefore develop either as 1) a "Unification" Navy, maximizing coercive pressure on Taiwan by focusing on regional anti-access strategies; 2) an "Influence Projection" Navy, capable of a wide range of operations, but not with a capability nearing a U.S. carrier strike group; or 3) a "Global/Hemispheric Sea Denial" / (cont.) Navy, designed around a fleet of ultra-quiet nuclear attack submarines, designed to deter a major naval power from dominating China's vital sea lines of communication. Although there is considerable variation in opinion and analysis as to the exact direction of China's grand strategy, the author identifies these models as the most logical force structure and maritime strategies that China might pursue in support of its maritime interests. / by Kevin Pickard, Jr. / S.M.

Thesis (Ph. D.)--Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Dept. of Political Science, 2001. / Includes bibliographical references (leaves 180-195). / American and European political scientists have claimed that subnational elections record lower voter turnout than national elections in most democracies. Contrary to this conventional wisdom, Japanese municipal elections often record considerably higher voter turnout than national elections, particularly in small towns and villages. Why is Japan different from most other democracies? Is Japan the only exception? What explains such exceptionally high local turnout in rural Japan? Under what conditions do lower-level elections produce higher voter turnout? By examining these questions, this dissertation aims to improve our understanding of incentives affecting electoral participation both at national and subnational levels. First, I show that Japan is not the only exception. There are some other important cases of higher voter turnout in lower-level elections, which I define as the "turnout twist" phenomenon. They can be found in Australia, Canada, Finland, France, India, Italy, Northern Ireland, Spain, and Switzerland. Second, I hypothesize that relative voter turnout in subnational vs. national elections is determined by the relative magnitudes of how much is at stake and how much votes count ("vote significance") in these elections. In lower-level elections, electoral outcomes may less significantly affect public policies, but citizens may be able to affect the electoral outcomes more significantly by voting. Therefore, if the effect of vote significance outweighs the effect of stake, "turnout twist" is a logically possible consequence. / (cont.) I statistically test this model using cross-national data, cross-municipality Japanese data, and individual-level survey data from Japan. The results show that the model has impressive explanatory power. Finally, based on findings from my field research, I show that the electoral system used in Japanese municipal assembly elections (i.e., the single non-transferable vote system with an at-large district) produces very small vote margins between candidates, and thus gives a strong incentive to both voters and candidates to think hard about how much votes count. / by Yusaku Horiuchi. / Ph.D.