When hiring new entrants into the labor market, firms make their decisions based on limited<br />information about worker ability. An estimation of ability must be gleaned from observable factors such as a worker\'s education level, GPA and interview performance. While some firms conduct further testing, it remains that an accurate evaluation of worker ability at the time of hiring is very difficult to achieve. Evidence suggests that much of a firm\'s evaluation of worker ability takes place after a worker has been hired. The purpose of this paper is to provide a thorough analysis of wage growth and a firm\'s ability to observe its workers\' productivity.<br /><br />I regress a Mincerian wage equation using data from the March 2009 Supplement of the Consumer Population Survey merged with additional industry data gathered from the Bureau of Labor Statistics. The coefficient of worker experience interacted with various measures of worker observability is used to provide an indication of the importance of worker observability in the growth of wages. I examine four potential measures of worker observability: firm size, occupation, industry, and worker-manager ratio. The results indicate a positive relationship between worker observability and wage growth when using firm size as a measure of observability. / Ph. D.

The decline in private sector wages in the aftermath of the Great Recession reopened a longstanding debate about whether public sector employees make more than private sector employees. However, much of this debate has only focused on the difference in wages over the past few years. This paper uses the Current Population Survey from 1995-2013 to examine how the federal-private wage differential has evolved over time. Wage regressions are estimated by year for federal and private sector workers. I then use these estimates to calculate the federal-private wage differential. This is augmented with selectivity bias corrections for each year. Probit estimates of the probability of receiving employer-provided health insurance and a pension plan are also estimated for each year. The findings suggest that the federal pay differential is invariably positive, but fell during the 1990s, began to rise in the early 2000s, and has continued to rise to the end of the sample period. In this paper, I also examine the difference in wage and fringe benefit between state/local government employees and private sector employees. For the analysis, this paper uses the American Community Survey from 2012-2014 to examine how the state/local-private wage gaps vary by state. Probit estimates of the probability of receiving employer-sponsored health insurance are also estimated. The findings present a wide range of the wage differentials between state/local government employees and private sector counterparts. On the other hand, public employees enjoy higher probability of receiving health insurance through a current employer.

Flexible compensation is a new concept in wage and salary administration which permits the employee to select from the various benefits, and cash, a plan tailored to meet his own needs, limited only by his total compensation and those statutory provisions pertaining to his wages. Within recent years, compensation practitioners have been urged in professional journals to adopt flexible compensation as a way to improve their compensation programs in order to attract, hold, and motivate employees. The purpose of this study is twofold. First, the results of this research will provide empirical data on the current status of flexible compensation for nonexempt employees in the United States. Second, the research will contribute toward the development of a set of comprehensive guidelines for implementing flexible compensation programs.

<p>Calmfors and Driffill in 1988 argued that there is a humpshaped relation between the degree of centralisation in wage bargaining structures within an economy and unemployment. They collected aggregate economic data from 17 different OECD economies and ranked them according to their relative degree of centralisation to prove their model. The model was further developed by Rowthorn who in 1992, using individual data from the same countries, concluded that there is a negative linear relationship between the degree of centralisation in wage bargaining structures and wage dispersion.</p><p>During the past two decades the Russian economy, as well as the Russian trade union movement, has transformed greatly. Membership rates in trade unions have fallen and bargaining leverage of trade unions vis-á-vis employers has decreased. Using data from ten sectors within the Russian economy (collected in interviews with trade union representatives in Moscow, June 2006) this essay questions whether the theoretical assumptions above hold in the Russian context. By ranking the sectors according to their relative degree of centralisation in wage bargaining structures and using these rankings as explanatory variables in econometric analyses with unemployment rates and wage dispersion rates as dependent variables, this essay finds little proof that the theoretical framework of Calmfors and Driffill holds within the Russian economy. However, Rowthorn’s model of centralisation and wage dispersion seems to be more valid.</p>

Calmfors and Driffill in 1988 argued that there is a humpshaped relation between the degree of centralisation in wage bargaining structures within an economy and unemployment. They collected aggregate economic data from 17 different OECD economies and ranked them according to their relative degree of centralisation to prove their model. The model was further developed by Rowthorn who in 1992, using individual data from the same countries, concluded that there is a negative linear relationship between the degree of centralisation in wage bargaining structures and wage dispersion. During the past two decades the Russian economy, as well as the Russian trade union movement, has transformed greatly. Membership rates in trade unions have fallen and bargaining leverage of trade unions vis-á-vis employers has decreased. Using data from ten sectors within the Russian economy (collected in interviews with trade union representatives in Moscow, June 2006) this essay questions whether the theoretical assumptions above hold in the Russian context. By ranking the sectors according to their relative degree of centralisation in wage bargaining structures and using these rankings as explanatory variables in econometric analyses with unemployment rates and wage dispersion rates as dependent variables, this essay finds little proof that the theoretical framework of Calmfors and Driffill holds within the Russian economy. However, Rowthorn’s model of centralisation and wage dispersion seems to be more valid.

In a simple oligopsonistic model, firms compete for labour through wages and job qualities. We modify the product market model developed by Vandenbosch/Weinberg 1995 and apply it to the job market with jobs being defined by two vertically differentiated non-wage characteristics. Workers differ in their valuation of these two characteristics but do not differ in their productivity. In equilibrium firms offer different wages and differ in only one of these non-wage characteristics. Whereas our labour market model is based on firms, we apply subclasses according to the UK SIC(2003) in our empirical analysis. When comparing subclasses within selected sectors (WERS) we found evidence that firms compete in both wages and job qualities. (author´s abstract) / Series: Department of Economics Working Paper Series

Thesis (M.B.A.)--University of Hong Kong, 1989.

Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of Wisconsin--Madison, 1962. / Typescript. Vita. eContent provider-neutral record in process. Description based on print version record. Includes bibliographical references.

There is at the present time a need for a great deal more study regarding the way in which wage payments are determined. Are wages determined or fixed by natural law? Or are they administered through the conscious effort of man? It will be the purpose of this study to partially investigate the determination of wages both theoretical and actual. Perhaps some insight may be gained that will give rough answers to the above questions.

Several interest groups seek to put a $15 per hour minimum wage amendment on the Florida ballot in 2020. Floridians voted successfully to increase the minimum wage back in 2004. While the measure passed by over 50% in every county, there were substantial differences. What explains variance in support for the 2004 Minimum Wage Amendment among Florida counties? Hypotheses were drawn from previous literature and theory and multiple regression models find several statistically significant results. The percentage of Hispanic residents and the percentage of residents with a high school education or less had a positive relationship with support for increasing the minimum wage, while the percentage of votes for President Bush had a negative relationship. Conclusions are drawn that suggest how these results may impact the expected upcoming vote to further increase the minimum wage in Florida.