No description available.

My aim in this thesis is to explain how a non-reductionist metaphysics can accommodate the causal relevance of the psychological and of the special sciences generally. According to physicalism, all behavior is caused by brain-states; given "folk-psychology", behavior (such as the waving of my hand) is caused by some psychological state. If psychological states are distinct from brain states (event dualism), then our behavior is overdetermined and this, it is claimed, is unacceptable. I argue that this consequence is not unacceptable. I claim that our explanatory practice should guide our ontological commitment. If we can offer true explanations that appeal to more than one event (or property), then we are committed to overdetermination for the event explained. I argue that accepting overdetermination is not absurd and that we can give an adequate account of causal relevance for psychological and other supervenient properties. The result is a partial defense of both property and event pluralism. Recent work by Davidson, Fodor, Jackson, Kim, Pettit and Yablo receives explicit and critical discussion.

No description available.

Counterfactual thinking is the tendency to view events that can easily be imagined otherwise as events that ought not to have been (Miller & Turnbull, 1990). Thirty-six male and sixty-five female subjects from introductory psychology courses completed a counterfactual thinking questionnaire and two personality measures assessing locus of control (Rotter Locus of Control Scale) and self-esteem (Texas Social Behavior Inventory). Results supported the hypothesis that people are more likely to generate counterfactual thoughts when their actions are perceived as easily mutable or when an event is easily imagined otherwise. Results also indicated that women were more likely to mutate events than were men. Finally, participants with high self-esteem were more likely to mutate events than were participants with low self-esteem. Results provided no evidence for a relationship between counterfactual thinking and locus of control. Factors that might have reduced the impact of the individual difference variables are considered. / Department of Psychological Science

This thesis explores preschoolers' use of causal-associations (associations between specific instrument and effects) and causal relations incorporating knowledge of transformation from initial to final states. Gelman, Bullock and Meek (1980) claimed that preschoolers use causal relations. However, in their study it was possible to make correct choices using causal-associations. Therefore, in Experiments 1 and 2 tasks were designed to distinguish between use of the two relations. Preschoolers made inferences about instruments which could produce the transformations depicted within event sequences (based on those used by Gelman et al.). Performance on tasks requiring selection of causal relations was significantly worse than performance on tasks where causal-associations could be used. Two methods of reasoning, Relational (causal) and Associative- Causal Matching, were identified. Modified versions of the tasks in Experiment 1 were used in Experiments 3, 4 and 5. Four-year-olds were more proficient at using Relational Methods than 3-year-olds although both ages demonstrated the ability to use this method. In Experiment 6 children had to construct sequences. Three-year-olds preferred associative constructions to causal ones. This preference may have influenced their performance in the previous experiments. Experiments 1, 2, 3 and 5 incorporated sequences with compound end-states (e.g. wet and broken cup). Three-year-olds clearly preferred to focus on just one of these attributes, chosen on the basis of salience. This preference evidently contributed to their lower scores throughout these experiments. However, even when relative salience was controlled (Experiment 7) or when single attributes were used (Experiment 4) 3-year-olds' performance was worse than 4-year-olds' in terms of choices based on causal relations. These experiments indicate that preschoolers use both Associative-Causal and Relational Methods. There is evidence for a shift from a preference for judgements based on associative relations to a preference for causal relations between 3 and 5 years. The ability to deal with compound features also appears to develop over the preschool years.

No description available.

Thesis (MPsy(Specialisation))--University of South Australia, 2003.

Thesis (M.A. 1978) from the Department of Philosophy, University of Adelaide.

Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of Canterbury, 2008. / Typescript (photocopy). "October 2008." Includes bibliographical references (p. 230-243). Also available via the World Wide Web.

Thesis PlanB (M.S.)--University of Wisconsin--Stout, 2008. / Includes bibliographical references.