Univ., Diss.--Zugl.: Paris.

It is held that the police officer is liable at criminal and civil law the same as the citizen; given constitutional expression in the common law office of constable. Yet, in the execution of their duty police officers are prone to committing a range of criminal offences - assault, false imprisonment, perverting the course of justice - defined in this thesis as police crimes. Statistical analysis reveals that police officers are rarely prosecuted for these offences, suggesting that criminal liability is an illusion, and civil proceedings have become an increasingly popular remedy for police wrongdoing. This thesis holds that ss.48 and 49 of the Police Act 1964 played a prominent part in undermining the police officer's accountability to the law. This was achieved under s.48 by removing the police officer's personal responsibility for his wrongdoing at civil law, and introduction of a vicarious liability rule. And, under s.49, by definition of reports of alleged criminal offences committed by police officers as complaints, and codification of a separate criminal procedure. Since the 1964 Act, statute and case law on police wrongdoing have caused further damage to the constitutional position by emphasising the internal police complaint and disciplinary processes and devaluing issues of liability. It is argued that there is a conflict between the ancient office of constable and the recently developed doctrine of constabulary independence, and it is proposed that a 'balance model' accurately reflects the constitutional position of the police. This thesis examines recent developments at common law alongside the statutory trend, including intended reform of the complaint and discipline processes, and concludes that the integrity of the constitutional position has been seriously damaged. It is proposed that the police officer is no longer accountable to the law for his wrongdoing in like manner as the citizen, and the office of constable survives as a constitutional fiction.

Thesis (doctoral)--Universität, Köln, 2006. / Includes bibliographical references (p. 245-278).

Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of Adelaide, 1987. / Includes abstract. Includes bibliographical references.

Thesis (doctoral)--Friedrich-Alexander-Universität zu Erlangen.

Thesis (doctoral)--Ludwig-Universität zu Giessen, 1936. / Includes bibliographical references.

Thesis (doctoral)--Ludwig-Universität zu Giessen, 1936. / Includes bibliographical references.

No name seems to have been associated with more systematic criticism in regard to political and social thought during the magisterial Reformation than that of the Old Testament lawgiver, Moses. Beginning early in the Reformation era, rejections of the need for Mosaic judicial laws are varied, broad, and explicit. In some cases, such as Luther’s and Melanchthon’s attacks on Andreas Karlstadt, alleged proponents of Mosaic civil law are given by name. In other cases they are anonymous. But what is less clear is whether anyone actually held the views attributed. After a review of literature of Melanchthon, Jacob Strauss, Karlstadt, Zwingli, Thomas Müntzer, the peasants of the Peasant War (1524–5), Luther, the Anabaptists of Münster, Calvin, and others, it is confirmed that none of the implicated writers between key dates of 1520 and 1536 actually held the view of exclusive Mosaic Law attributed, particularly by Calvin. Other motivations must have been involved in the accusations. An analysis of literature from Luther and Calvin as well as the historical background of the period makes it clear that social, political, and economic pressures influenced the magisterial reformers in regard to crucial theological expressions in which they strongly rejected the need for Mosaic civil law in society. The reformers in question restrained or altered their expressions according to the pressures of external circumstances - most importantly war and rebellion spurred by so-called “radical” reformers. As alleged theological positions were weaved with reports and denunciations of violence, Mosaic Law emerged as an allegedly dangerous ideological force, the accusation of which could marginalize opponents. In this crucible of history, in which the long shadows of rebellion and war were cast over Mosaic Law during the mid-1520s and mid-1530s, we find both Luther and Calvin (among others) writing their most vehement denunciations of Mosaic Law. Particularly, we find young Calvin, exiled, sitting down to write his denunciation of “some” who rejected the validity of a commonwealth unless it relied exclusively upon Mosaic civil polity. Luther, Calvin, and others thus warned against applying Moses in the civil realm and linked his laws with sedition and rebellion (even though the association was not accurate in any given case) mainly for their own utilitarian causes. Both Calvin and Luther subsequently employ the doctrine of two kingdoms in distancing themselves and their movements from the need for Mosaic laws in the civil realm, as well as to impede opponents who would use civil power to enforce reforms contrary to them, and yet both act inconsistently when enforcement of the first table of the Decalogue would favor their own reforms. As well, both go on to advance and approve of non-biblical civil laws more invasive and extensive than Mosaic polity would have allowed - including the execution of Anabaptists - all the while denouncing alleged proponents of Moses as dangerous, seditious, barbaric, murderous, and bloodthirsty. / Thesis (PhD)--University of Pretoria, 2012. / Dogmatics and Christian Ethics / unrestricted

No description available.

Univ., Diss.--Aix-Marseille, 2005.