During the First World War, ideas of duty and sacrifice were a dominant characteristic of public discourse in New Zealand. Specifically, concern centred on a perceived inequality of sacrifice, which saw brave soldiers die on the front lines, whilst other men remained on the home front, apparently avoiding duty. This thesis charts the prevailing and powerful ideas that circulated during wartime New Zealand around these two stereotypes; on the one hand there was the soldier, the ideal of service and duty; on the other, the conscientious objector, a target for the derogatory label of 'shirker'. While there are a few select critical works which examine the experiences of New Zealand World War One conscientious objectors, such We Will Not Cease (1939) and Armageddon or Calvary (1919), there is a near complete absence of studies which examine the home front and ask how conscientious objectors were perceived and consequently judged as they were. It is the contention of this thesis that ideas around the soldier and the 'shirker' were interrelated stereotypes and that both images emerged from the process of mass mobilisation; a highly organised war effort which was largely dependent for its success upon the cooperation of wider civilian society. In sum, the thesis examines and analyses the ideas within mainstream New Zealand society as they appeared in public sources (notably newspapers, cartoons and government publications), and in doing so, tracks how social mores and views towards duty, sacrifice and service were played out at a time of national and international crisis.

The main objective of this thesis is to examine conscientious objection to military service as a case of resistance to modern power in relation with the possibilities of &ldquo / self&rdquo / . In this context, Max Stirner&rsquo / s theory of &ldquo / ego&rdquo / and Michel Foucault&rsquo / s conceptualisations of modern power and modern subject are critically analyzed. In accordance with the relation between conscientious objection and the possibilities of self, Foucault&rsquo / s theories of &ldquo / power over life&rdquo / and &ldquo / ethics of care of self&rdquo / are discussed by examining disciplinary power and bio-power in relation with militarized society characterized by universal male conscription. On the other hand, Stirner&rsquo / s theory of &ldquo / the union of egoists&rdquo / and his conceptualization of &ldquo / Ownness&rdquo / is employed in order to investigate the possibilities of constituting an autonomous self. This study reveals that the act of conscientious objection overlaps objector&rsquo / s endeavour of creating an autonomous self. It is argued that following Stirnerian and Foucauldian conceptualisations of &ldquo / self&rdquo / , the objector, by refusing external power over his/her will in militarized society, indeed, engages in a struggle to constitute his/her own definition of self and his/her way of life.

Sous l’Ancien Régime, l’armée française était, en principe, composée de troupes professionnelles recrutées sur le mode du volontariat. Son recrutement était par ailleurs complété par différentes formes d’obligations militaires comme le ban, le guet et garde ou encore la milice provinciale. Les aspects techniques de ces institutions, leurs origines, leur évolution ou encore leur ampleur, sont connues. Il n’en va pas de même des fondements et des limites de l’exercice du pouvoir de contrainte qu’elles supposent. Il existe certes des études classiques sur l’histoire de la conscription, du pro patria mori ou de l’obligation to die for the state. Mais leurs conclusions sont contradictoires, elles négligent la doctrine et la législation d’Ancien Régime, et leur perspective n’embrasse qu’une partie des conditions de légitimité d’une obligation qui impose aux sujets de risquer leur vie et de tuer. L’objet du présent travail est donc d’offrir un exposé des justifications avancées en faveur ou contre l’obligation militaire, et d’identifier les débats auxquels celle-ci a donné lieu entre le XVIe et le XVIIIe siècle. Pour éclairer et ordonner le syncrétisme des préambules de la législation royale et déceler les obstacles que permettent de surmonter les arguments, il a paru nécessaire de calquer le plan de la thèse sur l’ordre du traitement de l’obligation militaire dans les ouvrages doctrinaux. Or, ceux-ci abordent l’obligation militaire sous trois angles complémentaires, trois séries de conditions cumulatives correspondant aux trois appartenances qui définissent l’état des personnes : citoyens membres du corps politique ; chrétiens membres du corps mystique de l’Église ; hommes intégrés dans un ordre et considérés dans leur individualité. À ces trois séries de personnes correspondent alors trois séries de biens : le bien commun de l’État, le bien divin, commun lui aussi, et le bien propre des individus. Ces trois biens correspondent aux conditions classiques de la légitimité des lois qui, dans la doctrine thomiste, sont orientées vers le bien commun, doivent respecter la loi divine et être justement réparties. Ces séries de considérations permettent de structurer la thèse en trois parties. Deux enseignements peuvent être tirés du tableau des conditions de légitimité de l’obligation militaire sous l’Ancien Régime. En premier lieu, il révèle un besoin constant de légitimation d’un devoir mortel. Tout absolu qu’il était, le roi de France ne pouvait exiger ad nutum l’obligation militaire. Il lui fallait, au moins, avancer une argumentation et, au mieux, respecter certaines conditions. En second lieu, l’histoire des justifications de l’obligation militaire sous l’Ancien Régime est celle de la progression du bien commun qui permet de repousser les limites traditionnelles qui encadrent le pouvoir royal. Cette évolution n’est pas sans susciter des critiques de la doctrine qui, d’une certaine façon, cherche à protéger l’individu. / Under the Ancien Régime, the French army was, in principle, composed of professional troops recruited on a voluntary basis. In addition, recruitment included various forms of military obligation, such as the arrière-ban, the watch and guard or the territorial militia. The technical aspects of those institutions are well known, as are their origins, their evolutions, and their scope. But the underlying foundations and limitations of the enforcement powers implied by them are not. There have been classic accounts of the history of conscription, pro patria mori, or the obligation to die for the state. But their conclusions are contradictory; they overlook the doctrine and legislation of the Ancien Régime, and they embrace but a fraction of the conditions governing the legitimacy of the obligation for subjects to risk their lives and kill. The subject of this present work is to offer an account of the justifications put forward in favor or against military obligation, and to identify the debates it has generated between the 16th and the 18th century. In order to clarify and organise the syncretism of the preambles of the royal legislation and detect the challenges that allows to overcome the arguments, it was deemed necessary to model the thesis plan on the treatment order of the military obligation in doctrinal publications. They address that topic from three complementary perspectives, with three sets of cumulative conditions corresponding to three affiliations that define a person’s status: citizen, who are members of the body politic; Christians, who are members of the mystical body of the Church; men members of an order or considered in their individuality. Three series of goods correspond to those three types: the common good of the State, the divine good, common as well, and the individual good. Those three goods correspond to the classical conditions of the law’s legitimacy that, in Thomistic doctrine, are aimed at the common good, must abide by the divine law and be justly distributed. These sets of considerations help to structure the thesis in three parts. Two conclusions can be drawn from the overview of the conditions for the legitimacy of military obligation under the Ancien Régime. Firstly, it shows a constant need of legitimation of a deadly duty. As absolute as he was, the King of France could not demand ad nutum military obligation. He needed to, at least, put forward an argument and, at best, respect certain conditions. Secondly, the history of the justifications for military obligation under the Ancien Régime is that of a progress of the common good, which led to push back the traditional limitations to the royal power. This evolution is not without instigating criticism of the doctrine that, in a certain way, seeks to protect the individual.

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In 1936 the founders of PAX aimed at 'resistance to modern warfare on grounds of traditional morality'. Believing that 'just war' criteria could no longer be met, they called themselves pacifists. Although most members were Roman Catholic Pax did not claim to be a 'Catholic society' because the RC Church at that time took an opposing view, particularly of conscientious objection. Church authorities attempted to censor Pax literature and instructed clergy to resign from the society. Pax supported conscientious objectors during the Second World War. When membership declined afterwards it continued to publish the Pax Bulletin and to provide a forum where Catholics could debate theological and practical questions of war and peace. By the 1960s Pax had gained some distinguished sponsors and a branch in the United States - support which enabled it to influence debate at the Second Vatican Council in 1965. The Council endorsed the right to conscientious objection. In 1971 Pax merged with Pax Christi, the international Catholic peace organisation which began in France in 1944/45. This is the first detailed historical study of the Roman Catholic element in the British peace movement. The story of Pax demonstrates the part that even a small pressure group can play in changing public opinion through patient work. Eventually, despite apathy and opposition, Pax helped bring the RC Church to a recognition of the right to conscientious objection and played a crucial role in the development of a more widespread peace movement within the Church

Doctor of Philosophy / Department of History / Mark P. Parillo / The primary figure in the creation and administration of alternative service for conscientious objectors (COs) during World War II was General Lewis B. Hershey, Director of the Selective Service. With an executive order by President Franklin D. Roosevelt placing the responsibility for alternative service on the shoulders of Hershey, any program within Civilian Public Service (the alternative service program for COs) desired by the Historic Peace Churches (Brethren, Mennonite, Society of Friends) needed Hershey’s approval before it could commence. As a product of the National Guard, Hershey possessed a strong belief in the duty of the citizen to the state in a time of national emergency. However, Hershey also had Mennonite ancestry and a strong belief in minority rights. Though not personally religious, all of his beliefs towards religion, duty, minority rights, and service contributed to a much more liberal policy for COs during World War II, compared to the insensitive treatment of them during the First World War. In short, “Protector of Conscience, Proponent of Service” argues that Lewis Hershey held the primary authority for constructing policy concerning conscientious objection during World War II, and his personal beliefs and actions in shaping alternative service during that time established precedent for the remaining years of conscription in the United States. From the initial peacetime draft in 1940 to the end of conscription in 1973, alternative service remained as the central form of a CO’s duty to the state in lieu of serving in the military. Hershey’s beliefs and actions during World War II resulted in a concept of alternative service that remained for the following years of conscription in the United States, providing an illuminating example of how the concept of the citizen soldier evolved in American military history and extended even to those who refused to serve in the military.

In 1936 the founders of PAX aimed at 'resistance to modern warfare on grounds of traditional morality'. Believing that 'just war' criteria could no longer be met, they called themselves pacifists. Although most members were Roman Catholic Pax did not claim to be a 'Catholic society' because the RC Church at that time took an opposing view, particularly of conscientious objection. Church authorities attempted to censor Pax literature and instructed clergy to resign from the society. Pax supported conscientious objectors during the Second World War. When membership declined afterwards it continued to publish the Pax Bulletin and to provide a forum where Catholics could debate theological and practical questions of war and peace. By the 1960s Pax had gained some distinguished sponsors and a branch in the United States - support which enabled it to influence debate at the Second Vatican Council in 1965. The Council endorsed the right to conscientious objection. In 1971 Pax merged with Pax Christi, the international Catholic peace organisation which began in France in 1944/45. This is the first detailed historical study of the Roman Catholic element in the British peace movement. The story of Pax demonstrates the part that even a small pressure group can play in changing public opinion through patient work. Eventually, despite apathy and opposition, Pax helped bring the RC Church to a recognition of the right to conscientious objection and played a crucial role in the development of a more widespread peace movement within the Church

Health conscientious objection in Spain: nature and exerciseConscientious objection is conceived as the infringement of a legal duty, peacefully and morally motivated, which aims to safeguard the own moral integrity against a heteronomous imperative judged as unfair. Generally, there is social agreement concerning some justice principles that generate group-shared laws. However, there can be disagreement among some of the members of the group, which can lead them to decide to break the law. The aim of this paper is to reflect on the social and juridical legitimacy of an individual’s moral obligation to disobey a rule that is incompatible with his or her personal options, in order to assert that faculty and base it on the existence of a conscientious objection right. Also, it seeks to point out the existing difficulties in Spain to exercise the conscientious objection within the healthcare sector. / La objeción de conciencia se concibe como el incumplimiento de un deber jurídico, pacífica y moralmente motivado, que procura salvaguardar la propia integridad moral frente a un imperativo heterónomo que se juzga injusto. En general, existe acuerdo social en torno a unos principios de justicia que generan normas compartidas por el grupo. Sin embargo, pueden existir discrepancias entre algunos de los miembros del mismo, que los lleven a optar por la desobediencia a la norma. En este trabajo se pretende reflexionar acerca de la legitimidad social y jurídica de la obligación moral de un individuo de desobedecer o incumplir una norma jurídica incompatible con sus opciones personales, con el objetivo de afirmar dicha facultad y fundamentarla en la existencia de un derecho a la objeción de conciencia. También se quiere poner de manifiesto las dificultades que encuentra en España el ejercicio de la objeción de conciencia en el contexto sanitario.

It is important that the story of organisations like the End Conscription Campaign be recorded. The narrative of the struggle against apartheid has become a site of contestation. As the downfall of apartheid is still a relatively recent event, the history is still in the process of formation. There is much contestation over the relative contributions of different groups within the struggle. This is an important debate as it informs and shapes the politics of the present. A new official narrative is emerging which accentuates the role of particular groupings, portraying them as the heroes and the leaders of the struggle. A new elite have laid exclusive claim to the heritage of the struggle and are using this narrative to justify their hold on power through the creation of highly centralised political structures in which positions of power are reserved for loyal cadres and independent thinking and questioning are seen as a threat. A complementary tradition of grassroots democracy, of open debate and transparency, of “people’s power”, of accountability of leadership to the people fostered in the struggle is being lost. It is important to contest this narrative. We need to remember that the downfall of apartheid was brought about by a myriad combination of factors and forces. Current academic interpretations emphasize that no one group or organisation, no matter how significant its contribution, was solely responsible. There was no military victory or other decisive event which brought the collapse of the system, rather a sapping of will to pay the ever increasing cost to maintain it. The struggle against apartheid involved a groundswell, popular uprising in which the initiative came not from centralised political structures, orchestrating a grand revolt, but from ordinary South Africans who were reacting to the oppressive nature of a brutally discriminatory system which sought to control every aspect of their lives.4 Leaders and structures emerged organically as communities organised themselves around issues that affected them. Organisations that emerged were highly democratic and accountable to their members. There was no grand plan or centralised control of the process. As Walter Benjamin warned in a different context, but applicable here: “All rulers are the heirs of those who have conquered before them.” He feared that what he referred to as a historicist view constructed a version of history as a triumphal parade of progress. “Whoever has emerged victorious” he reminds us “participates to this day in the triumphal procession in which the present rulers step over those who are lying prostrate. According to traditional practice the spoils are carried along in the procession.” 5 He was warning of just such a tendency, which has been repeated so often in the past, for the victors to construct a version of history which ends up justifying a new tyranny. To counter this tendency it is important that other histories of the struggle are told – that the stories of other groups, which are marginalised by the new hegemonic discourse, are recorded.This aim of this dissertation is thus two-fold. Firstly it aims to investigate “the story” of the End Conscription Campaign, which has largely been seen as a white anti-apartheid liberal organisation. The objective is to provide a detailed historical account and periodisation of the organisation to fill in the gaps and challenge the distortions of a new emerging “official” discourse.Secondly within this framework, and by using the activities and strategies of the organisation as evidence for its suppositions, the question of the role played by the ECC in the struggle.

Doctors' Right to Withhold Medical Care Abstract Very little attention is being paid to the rights doctors have to refuse to provide medical care, notwithstanding how important this area of interest is. It is not the aim of this thesis to provide a superficial description of fundamental grounds for withholding treatment. Its primary purpose is to present an analysis of the issues that are of most concern. To this end, the key concepts closely examined are conscientious objection and religious beliefs, as these constitute the subject of frequent interpretative, judicial and ethical disputes. A chapter in this thesis is also dedicated to refusal to provide healthcare based on a risk to the life or body of the health professional. All of the other reasons for not providing medical care or for ending it are briefly discussed within the context of the so-called contractual obligation of healthcare providers. Conscientious objection and religious beliefs are most often viewed from the perspective of public law. Nevertheless, in this thesis the two concepts are presented mainly in the light of private and civil law. A short philosophical and ethical analysis of the two concepts is followed by an extensive legal analysis. The theoretical part of the thesis concentrates on related statutory regulation and the...